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ABSTRACT
How can law best mitigate harm from crises like storms, epidemics,
and financial meltdowns? This Article uses the law and economics
framework of property rules and liability rules to analyze crisis
responses across multiple areas of law, focusing particularly on the
ways the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) battled the 2008–09 financial
crisis.
Remarkably, the IRS’s responses to that crisis cost more than
Congress’s higher-profile bank bailouts. Despite their costs, many of
the IRS’s responses were underinclusive, causing preventable layoffs
and foreclosures. This Article explains these failures and demonstrates
that the optimal response to crises is to shift from harsh property rules
to compensatory liability rules, temporarily. Arranging such a shift in
advance further mitigates harm when crises arrive.
This analysis also provides new insights for the broader literature
on property rules and liability rules. For example, arranging in advance
for temporary moves to liability rules during crises can avoid windfalls,
allow speedier relief, and encourage flexible private contracts. These
lessons have practical applications in areas as far afield as how
constitutional law and patent law respond to epidemics.
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INTRODUCTION
In the famous 1908 torts case Ploof v. Putnam,1 a “violent
tempest” arose, causing Sylvester Ploof to moor his boat at a dock
owned by Henry Putnam,2 who expelled the boat, causing Ploof to
shipwreck.3 Ploof successfully sued Putnam, and the case established
that property owners cannot exclude trespassers seeking refuge during
times of necessity.4 The similarly famous 1910 torts case Vincent v.
Lake Erie Transportation Co.5 refined Ploof. In that case, a storm
caused a boater to remain moored to a dock, seriously damaging it.6
The court required the boater to compensate the dock owner for this
damage.7 These two cases are the foundation for tort law’s doctrine of
necessity.8
Tax law should adopt the insights of Ploof and Vincent to minimize
the damage to taxpayers, to tax revenues, and to the broader economy
during financial crises. Both tort law and tax law have property rules
and liability rules, which are “workhorse concepts that permeate every
corner of the economic analysis of law.”9 Property rules give
entitlement holders protection through coercive measures, while
liability rules give entitlement holders only the right to compensation.
For example, in normal times, dock owners are protected by property
rules and are free to decide who may moor at their docks. But Ploof
established that emergencies like storms turn off this property-rule
protection, and Vincent held that liability-rule protection temporarily

1. Ploof v. Putnam, 71 A. 188 (Vt. 1908).
2. Id. at 188.
3. Id. at 188–89.
4. Id. at 189; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 197(1), 263(1) (AM. LAW INST.
1965).
5. Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910).
6. Id. at 221.
7. Id. at 222.
8. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 197 cmt. g, cmt. j (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (citing
Ploof and Vincent).
9. Lee Anne Fennell, Adjusting Alienability, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1403, 1405 (2009); see also
Andrew Blair-Stanek, Tax in the Cathedral: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Tax, 99 VA. L.
REV. 1169, 1187–95 (2013) (demonstrating that tax law has both property and liability rules); cf.
Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972) (introducing the distinction between
property rules and liability rules).
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applies instead.10
Many tax requirements have property-rule protection; that is, the
taxpayer must comply on pain of draconian tax increases regardless of
the size of the violation.11 Other requirements are protected by liability
rules, where a taxpayer that fails the requirement owes the IRS
compensatory taxes proportional to the violation.12 Under either rule,
the IRS holds the entitlement, like the dock owners in Ploof and
Vincent.
Property rules in tax often make sense during times of financial
calm, for a number of reasons, such as property rules’ ability to deter
taxpayers from violating tax law requirements and the potential
mathematical complexity of implementing liability rules.13 But during
financial crises, taxpayers may be unable to comply with some
requirements due to cash shortages or other effects of the crisis.
Draconian property rules can have disastrous consequences for
taxpayers already in distress, leading to bankruptcies, layoffs,
foreclosures, and financial contagion.14
During the 2008–09 financial crisis, public attention focused on
Congress’s and the Federal Reserve’s nontax bailouts, like the
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP).15 Meanwhile, the IRS fought
a parallel, but less publicized, battle to ensure that tax property rules
did not deepen the crisis.16 Astonishingly, the IRS’s responses cost
more than the much-reviled TARP.17
10. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Pliability Rules, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1, 5, 67
(2002) (introducing the concept of “pliability rules”).
11. Blair-Stanek, supra note 9, at 1187–92; cf. Henry E. Smith, Ambiguous Quality Changes
from Taxes and Legal Rules, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 647, 661 (2000) (noting that tax laws “can often
have the effect of mandating features of a transaction or activity”).
12. Blair-Stanek, supra note 9, at 1192–95.
13. See infra Part III.C.2.
14. Cf. ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED 143–44 (2011) (discussing how
unpredictable human-driven events like Russia’s 1998 default on its debt can precipitate financial
disasters); Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy or Bailouts?, 35 J. CORP. L. 469,
490 (2010) (noting that “[e]conomic theories can explain the consequences of panic runs when
they occur . . . [but] do not explain what triggers them in the first place”).
15. Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, tit. I., 122 Stat. 3765, 3767.
16. For further discussion of the IRS’s responses to the 2008–09 crisis, see infra Part II.
17. In fact, TARP has turned a profit for the government. See Paul Kiel & Dan Nguyen,
Bailout Tracker, PROPUBLICA (Jan. 30, 2017), https://web.archive.org/web/20170202174559/
http://projects.propublica.org/bailout [https://perma.cc/T874-7JB9] (showing profit of $75.8
billion). Although it is impossible to determine the exact cost of the IRS responses to the financial
crisis—because tax returns are confidential, see I.R.C. § 6103 (2012)—IRS’ responses were
enormously expensive. One of the IRS’s bad responses cost the government approximately $22
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The IRS implicitly recognized the lesson from Ploof that property
rules should not apply during emergencies because property rules can
result in the financial equivalent of shipwrecks for taxpayers unable to
comply. The IRS moved with admirable speed in 2008–09 to waive the
property rules in tax law that risked worsening the crisis. Examples
include requirements about mutual fund distributions,18 modifying
mortgages in mortgage-backed bonds,19 and cash borrowed from
foreign subsidiaries.20
But Ploof is only half of the doctrine of necessity. Vincent is the
other half, replacing the property rules with compensatory liability
rules during the emergency. In tort law, having Ploof but not Vincent
would create two fundamental problems. First, boaters would get
unjust windfalls at dock owners’ expense, and, second, boaters would
have inefficient incentives to moor at docks even when not necessary.21
The IRS’s best responses to the 2008–09 crisis incorporated both
Ploof’s and Vincent’s principles, temporarily replacing property rules
with liability rules.22 But some of the IRS’s other responses adopted
Ploof but not Vincent, meaning the IRS did not enforce property rules,
and yet did not replace them with liability rules.23 These badly crafted
responses created predictable problems, specifically unjust windfalls
for some taxpayers, and inefficient incentives for taxpayers to violate
tax law requirements when it was not truly necessary. After the crisis
passed and the IRS’s actions finally received scrutiny, these badly
crafted responses drew vehement criticism from the popular media, tax
commentators, and Congress.24
billion in lost taxes from Wells Fargo alone. See, e.g., infra Part II.B.3; infra note 237. The IRS’s
handout to General Motors cost approximately $12 billion, which is more than the $10 billion
final cost of the company’s TARP bailout. See, e.g., BILL CANIS & BAIRD WEBEL, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., THE ROLE OF TARP ASSISTANCE IN THE RESTRUCTURING OF GENERAL
MOTORS 13 (2014); infra Part II.B.4.
18. See infra Part II.A.1. The IRS also waived a similar requirement applying to real estate
investments trusts. Infra Part II.A.2.
19. See infra Part II.B.5.
20. See infra Part II.B.1–2.
21. See infra notes 98–102 and accompanying text.
22. See infra Part II.A.
23. See infra Part II.B. IRS nonenforcement is technically giving the taxpayer the
entitlement, protected by a property rule. The literature calls this result “Rule 3.” See Calabresi
& Melamed, supra note 9, at 1116 (introducing “rule three” in tort context).
24. See, e.g., American Recovery & Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1261, 123
Stat. 115, 342–43 (criticizing and expressly repealing I.R.S. Notice 2008-83); Martin A. Sullivan &
Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis: Repatriation Aid for the Financial Crisis?, 122 TAX NOTES 7
(2009); Shamik Trivedi, Media Renews Criticism of Treasury NOL Guidance, 134 TAX NOTES 121
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Future financial crises are inevitable.25 The history of the U.S.
economy is replete with financial crises, starting with the crash of 1792,
which Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton quelled.26 As two
economists recently observed, “[c]rises cannot be abolished; like
hurricanes, they can only be managed and mitigated.”27
This Article details how the IRS can mitigate future financial
crises by drawing on the rich history of the 2008–09 financial crisis and
the property-rule and liability-rule frameworks. These lessons are
timely given the many factors that currently threaten financial crises,28
such as the eurozone’s possible breakup,29 increasing capital flight from
(2012); Lawrence Zelenak, Can Obama’s IRS Retroactively Revoke Massive Bank Giveaway?,
122 TAX NOTES 889 (2009); Stephen J. Lubben, For Treasury, a Hidden Cost for Helping G.M.,
N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Nov. 16, 2010, 11:22 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/11/16/fortreasury-a-hidden-cost-for-helping-g-m/?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/XVT6-6VU5]; Randall Smith &
Sharon Terlep, GM Could Be Free of Taxes for Years, WALL STREET J. (Nov. 3, 2010, 12:01 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704462704575590642149103202 [https://perma.
cc/8GE3-LHS8]; GM’s Tax Shelter: Another $16 Billion Not Available to Other Car Makers,
WALL STREET J. (July 31, 2009, 4:59 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240529
70203609204574314180298525294 [https://perma.cc/W9NY-P495]; Tax Gain Lifts A.I.G. Profit to
$19.8 Billion, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/24/business/tax-gainlifts-aig-profit-to-19-8-billion.html [https://perma.cc/36BR-G8XL].
25. See, e.g., NOURIEL ROUBINI & STEPHEN MIHM, CRISIS ECONOMICS 4 (2011) (“[C]rises
are the norm, not only in emerging but in advanced industrial economies. Crises . . . have always
been with us, and with us they will always remain. . . . Crises will figure in our future.”). See
generally Hyman P. Minsky, The Financial Instability Hypothesis (Levy Econ. Inst. of Bard Coll.,
Working Paper No. 74, 1992), http://ssrn.com/abstract=161024 [https://perma.cc/QRN9-F9JV]
(proposing hypothesis as to why crises are a recurring feature of capitalism).
26. See Financial Crises: The Slumps That Shaped Modern Finance, ECONOMIST, http://
www.economist.com/news/essays/21600451-finance-not-merely-prone-crises-it-shaped-themfive-historical-crises-show-how-aspects-today-s-fina [https://perma.cc/D7ED-898P]; see also
CHARLES W. CALOMIRIS & STEPHEN H. HABER, FRAGILE BY DESIGN: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS
OF BANKING CRISES AND SCARCE CREDIT 5 (2014) (noting that the United States has had
fourteen banking crises over the past 180 years); id. at 153–282 (detailing the United States’
history of crises).
27. ROUBINI & MIHM, supra note 25, at 275.
28. HENRY M. PAULSON, JR., ON THE BRINK: INSIDE THE RACE TO STOP THE COLLAPSE
OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 44–45 (2010) (noting that financial crises come regularly);
Collateral Damage: How Bank Funding May Be Squeezed in the Next Crisis, ECONOMIST (Oct.
17, 2015), https://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21674776-how-bank-funding
-may-be-squeezed-next-crisis-collateral-damage [https://perma.cc/RQ9W-FMN5]; We All Hang
Together: The Crisis of 2023, ECONOMIST (Oct. 3, 2015), https://www.economist.com/ news/
special-report/21668720-crisis-2023-we-all-hang-together [https://perma.cc/S82B-7RT5] (setting
out a scenario for a serious financial crisis in 2023).
29. See, e.g., The Euro Zone’s Boom Masks Problems That Will Return To Haunt It,
ECONOMIST (Dec. 2, 2017), https://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21731822mismatch-between-its-economic-and-political-institutions-persists-euro [https://perma.cc/A8M2Y8Q8]; France’s Next Revolution: The Vote That Could Wreck the European Union, ECONOMIST
(Mar. 4, 2017), https://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21717814-why-french-presidential-
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China,30 various asset bubbles,31 and populist politicians’ threats of
trade wars.32
This Article contributes to the broader property-rule and liabilityrule literature by identifying new ways to most effectively use liability
rules to respond to crises. Because property rules and liability rules
appear across all areas of law,33 these insights inform fields as diverse
as constitutional law, patent law, and bankruptcy law. For example,
bankruptcy law can better prevent types of “bank runs” during
financial crises by shifting temporarily to liability rules. In the same
way, constitutional law can better handle quarantines of individuals
potentially infected with quick-spreading epidemics like Ebola, severe
acute respiratory syndrome (SARS),34 and biological weapons.
Likewise, patent law can better provide access to drugs that might fight
such epidemics. Globalization increasingly lets epidemics travel widely
and quickly, making good legal responses essential.35
Part I discusses the distinction between property rules and liability
rules, which Professors Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed
introduced in a pioneering 1972 article.36 This distinction has been

election-will-have-consequences-far-beyond-its-borders-vote [https://perma.cc/M9SE-RPCW]
(“If [presidential candidate Marine Le Pen] pulls France out of the euro, it would trigger a
financial crisis . . . .”).
30. See, e.g., Carolyn Cui & Juliet Chung, Kyle Bass Steps Up Attack on China’s Currency,
WALL STREET J. (Feb. 11, 2016, 7:10 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/kyle-bass-hedge-fundestimates-chinas-foreign-reserves-below-critical-level-1455128104
[https://perma.cc/34MXZZGM] (recounting a prominent fund manager’s prediction that China will have difficulty
weathering a recent “torrent of capital outflows”).
31. See, e.g., MARTIN WOLF, THE SHIFTS AND THE SHOCKS: WHAT WE’VE LEARNED AND
HAVE STILL TO LEARN FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 113–90 (2014); Ryan Tracy, Fed Eyes
Margin Rules To Bolster Oversight, WALL STREET J. (Jan. 10, 2016, 7:12 PM), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/fed-eyes-margin-rules-to-bolster-oversight-1452471174 [https://perma.cc/
2YGY-P32E] (“[O]fficials fret about whether they have adequate tools to suppress dangerous
asset bubbles that could lead to another financial crisis.”).
32. See, e.g., America, China and the Risk of a Trade War, ECONOMIST (Jan. 28, 2017),
https://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21715656-trade-tensions-will-mountdestructive-trade-war-can-still-be [https://perma.cc/PBJ2-N9HH].
33. See Fennell, supra note 9, at 1404 (noting that law and economics scholars frequently
address property rules and liability rules).
34. SARS caused 8096 cases and 774 deaths in thirty-seven countries over 2002 and 2003.
See Summary of Probable SARS Cases with Onset of Illness From 1 November 2002 to 31 July
2003, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/csr/sars/country/table2004_04_21/en/ [https://
perma.cc/99E3-DR4Z].
35. See Let Us Spray, ECONOMIST (Jan. 28, 2016), https://www.economist.com/ news/
leaders/21689542-dont-panic-kill-mosquitoes-let-us-spray
[https://perma.cc/TH82-3GVG]
(“[G]lobalisation means that plagues can travel far, wide and terrifyingly fast.”).
36. See generally Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 9 (introducing the distinction between
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applied to virtually every area of law, ranging from contracts and torts
to constitutional law and intellectual property.37 Tax law similarly
features both property rules and liability rules.38 Part I also discusses
“pliability rules,” where a triggering event—such as a storm, epidemic,
or financial crisis—causes a property rule to move, temporarily, to a
liability rule.39 Part I concludes by demonstrating how pliability rules
are excellent responses to crises in multiple areas of law.40
Part II surveys the IRS’s major responses to the 2008–09 financial
crisis, which all embodied Ploof’s insight that crisis-worsening property
rules should be waived during crises. Some of the IRS’s responses,
which this article will refer to as the “good responses,” followed
Vincent as well, and shifted temporarily to liability rules.41 Like tort
law’s doctrine of necessity, these good responses were economically
efficient and prevented inequitable enrichment of the affected
taxpayers. Indeed, this approach worked even better in tax law than in
tort law, since in tax law it minimized harm to third parties and to the
overall economy.42 Meanwhile the IRS’s other responses, which this
article will refer to as the “bad responses,” ignored Vincent and simply
stopped enforcing property rules in many instances, creating windfalls
and inefficient incentives for taxpayers.43 The IRS knew that it was
creating windfalls, and accordingly kept its relief so narrowly tailored
that many taxpayers got no relief at all, resulting in avoidable
foreclosures and layoffs.
property rules and liability rules). Calabresi became a U.S. circuit judge in 1994, but remains the
Sterling Professor Emeritus and Professorial Lecturer in Law at Yale Law School. Melamed
became a Professor of the Practice of Law at Stanford Law School in 2015, capping an illustrious
career practicing law.
37. E.g., Richard Craswell, Property Rules and Liability Rules in Unconscionability and
Related Doctrines, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1993) (applying the property–liability rules distinction
from Calabresi and Melamed to contract law); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules
Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1996) (applying the
distinction to various areas); Eugene Kontorovich, Liability Rules for Constitutional Rights: The
Case of Mass Detentions, 56 STAN. L. REV. 755 (2004) (applying the distinction to constitutional
law); Anthony T. Kronman, Specific Performance, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 351, 352 (1978) (applying
the distinction to contract law); Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability
Rules Govern Information?, 85 TEX. L. REV. 783 (2007) (applying the distinction to information
ownership); Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 COLUM.
L. REV. 2655 (1994) (applying the distinction to intellectual property).
38. See infra Part I.B.
39. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 10, at 5.
40. See infra Part I.C–D.
41. See infra Part II.A.
42. See infra Parts II.A.1.b, III.A.3.
43. See infra Part II.B.
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Part III draws conclusions, relevant across many areas of law,
about the best legal responses to crises. Most obviously, moving from
crisis-worsening property rules to liability rules temporarily during
crises minimizes harm. Some benefits, like preventing windfalls,
stopping contagion, and enabling broader-based relief, apply even if
policymakers craft the temporary liability rule on the fly in response to
crises. But arranging the temporary liability rules in advance, before
crises start, can bring even greater benefits, including speedier
reaction,44 prevention of moral hazard,45 greater transparency,46 more
flexible private contracts,47 better-designed triggers,48 and proper legal
authority.49 Part III discusses how these benefits and insights can help
to address crises across multiple areas of law, including bankruptcy law,
patent law, and constitutional law.
I. PROPERTY RULES, LIABILITY RULES, AND PLIABILITY RULES
This Part begins with an overview of property rules and liability
rules, those “workhorse concepts that permeate every corner of the
economic analysis of law.”50 The Part then discusses property rules and
liability rules in tax law.51 It also considers pliability rules, a powerful
extension of the property and liability rule concepts.52
A. Property Rules and Liability Rules
Calabresi and Melamed’s seminal 1972 article, Property Rules,
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,53
introduced the distinction between property rules and liability rules.
Scholars have used these concepts to draw insights into areas as diverse
as torts,54 property,55 contracts,56 intellectual property,57 constitutional

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

See infra Part III.B.1.
See infra Part III.B.2.
See infra Part III.B.3.
See infra Part III.B.4.
See infra Part III.B.5.
See infra Part III.B.6.
Fennell, supra note 9, at 1404–05.
See infra Part I.B.
See infra Parts I.C–I.D.
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 9.
See, e.g., id. at 1089.
See, e.g., id.; Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 37, at 715.
See, e.g., Craswell, supra note 37, at 1.
See, e.g., Lemley & Weiser, supra note 37, at 783; Merges, supra note 37, at 2655.

BLAIR-STANEK IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1164

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

2/28/2018 10:42 PM

[Vol. 67:1155

law,58 and tax law.59
Property rules protect legal entitlements through deterrence.60
Examples include injunctions, jail time, forcible expulsion, and
disgorgement of profits.61 By contrast, liability rules protect legal
entitlements by requiring monetary compensation for violating the
entitlement.62
For example, suppose that a factory’s pollution harms neighboring
residents. A property rule would impose a draconian penalty on the
factory, such as enjoining further pollution, imprisoning the factory’s
managers, or ordering disgorgement of all the factory’s profits.63 By
contrast, a liability rule protecting the residents’ entitlement to clean
air would require the factory to pay compensatory damages to the
residents but would let the pollution continue.64 Liability rules set a
price that compensates residents such that the factory will pollute only
when it is economically efficient; property rules, in contrast, set a
penalty so high that the factory should never rationally incur it.
The term “property rule” is a misnomer. Property rules protect
many entitlements that are not “property” at all. For example,
property rules often protect individual liberties under the
Constitution65 and consumers’ rights to rescind unconscionable
contracts.66 Individuals often have a property-rule right to force a
factory to stop polluting, so as to protect their lungs.67 For better or
worse, Calabresi’s and Melamed’s seminal article coined the term
“property rule,” and it stuck. A name like “draconian rule” or
“deterrence rule” would likely be more accurate than “property rule,”
58. See, e.g., Kontorovich, supra note 37, at 755.
59. See Blair-Stanek, supra note 9, at 1169.
60. Ian Ayres & Paul M. Goldbart, Optimal Delegation and Decoupling in the Design of
Liability Rules, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1, 2 (2001) (“Property rules protect entitlements by trying to
deter others from taking. Liability rules, on the other hand, protect entitlements not by deterring
but by trying to compensate the victim of nonconsensual takings.”).
61. See IAN AYRES, OPTIONAL LAW: THE STRUCTURE OF LEGAL ENTITLEMENTS 13
(2005).
62. Id.
63. See id. at 13.
64. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 9, at 1092, 1121; see, e.g., Boomer v. Atl. Cement
Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 875 (N.Y. 1970) (awarding permanent damages to residents against a nearby
cement factory).
65. Kontorovich, supra note 37, at 758, 771.
66. Craswell, supra note 37, at 18.
67. See, e.g., Coal. for Clean Air v. VWR Int’l, LLC, 922 F. Supp. 2d 1089, 1100 (E.D. Cal.
2013) (allowing plaintiffs alleging injury from breathing “less pure” air, but no property-related
injury, to pursue an injunction against polluters).
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but this Article will use the term “property rule” for consistency with
the extensive literature.
Scholars have long debated the relative merits of property and
liability rules.68 Professors Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell made the
important observation that property rule and liability rule remedies are
not two distinct categories, but rather lie along one continuum from
zero damages to infinitely high damages.69 Liability rules set the
remedy to compensatory damages, while property-rule remedies set
the remedy much higher up the continuum, at a level so high as to be
draconian.70 In other words, property rules and liability rules differ in
the degree of severity, not in kind.
B. Tax Law’s Property and Liability Rules
Tax law uses both property rules and liability rules to protect the
government’s entitlement to taxpayer compliance with numerous
requirements.71 In other words, when a taxpayer violates a requirement
set out in tax law, property rules and liability rules represent the two
basic approaches for protecting the government’s entitlement to
compliance with any given requirement.
For example, the taxpayer’s taxes can increase by an amount that
compensates the government for the harm that violating the
requirement caused, such as lost tax revenues.72 This is a liability-rule
approach.73 Second, the taxpayer can suffer a punitive,
disproportionate increase in taxes, which is a property-rule approach.74
Tax requirements for mutual funds illustrate this distinction.
Mutual funds enable average investors to buy a diversified portfolio of

68. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & J.M. Balkin, Legal Entitlements as Auctions: Property Rules,
Liability Rules, and Beyond, 106 YALE L.J. 703, 705–06 & n.9 (1996); James E. Krier & Stewart
J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV.
440, 450–51 (1995) (deeming it a “virtual doctrine” that “[w]hen transaction costs are low, use
property rules; when transaction costs are high, use liability rules”); Stewart E. Sterk, Property
Rules, Liability Rules, and Uncertainty About Property Rights, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1285, 1296–97
(2008) (building on the work of Thomas W. Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs of
Determining Property Rights, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 13 (1985)).
69. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 37, at 756–57.
70. See id. at 756. Of course, property rules in favor of defendants are the same as zero
damages; that is, the bottom of the continuum.
71. See Blair-Stanek, supra note 9, at 1187–95.
72. See id. at 1192–95.
73. See id.
74. See id. at 1187–92.
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investments.75 If a mutual fund meets certain requirements, it qualifies
for incredibly favorable tax status that allows it to avoid paying
corporate taxes.76 Some mutual fund requirements are protected by
property rules and others by liability rules.
One requirement protected by a property-rule remedy is that a
mutual fund must distribute at least 90 percent of its income to its
investors.77 This 90 percent distribution requirement ensures that
mutual funds are serving their designed purpose of investing on behalf
of average investors, rather than hoarding cash. If a mutual fund
distributes only 89 percent of its income, then suddenly all its income
is subject to the full corporate tax.78 This massive increase in taxes is
totally out of proportion to the amount by which that fund has failed
the 90 percent distribution requirement, yet it forces the mutual fund
to disgorge all the benefits of its previously held favorable tax status.
As a practical matter, a mutual fund that lost its favorable tax
status would collapse, and investors would rush to withdraw their
funds.79 It continues to be true that, as Chief Justice John Marshall
observed two centuries ago in McCulloch v. Maryland,80 “the power to
tax involves the power to destroy.”81
Mutual funds also have requirements protected by liability-rule
remedies. For example, a mutual fund must earn at least 90 percent of
its income from interest, dividends, and gains from selling securities.82
This 90 percent income requirement ensures that mutual funds serve

75. See I.R.C. § 851(a)(1) (2012); Richard M. Hervey, Taxation of Regulated Investment
Companies and Their Shareholders, U.S. Income Portfolios (BNA) No. 740-3d, VI.B.
76. Specifically, qualifying mutual funds can deduct all dividends paid out to shareholders,
which entirely, or nearly entirely, relieves the mutual fund of paying corporate taxes. I.R.C.
§§ 852(b)(1) & (b)(2)(D); Hervey, supra note 75, § VIII.A. The technical term for a mutual fund
qualifying for the favorable tax status is “regulated investment company” (RIC).
77. I.R.C. § 852(a)(1). The specific requirement is paying out 90 percent of its ordinary
income and 90 percent of its tax-exempt interest. Id. There is no distribution threshold with
respect to net capital gain. Id.
78. See Treas. Reg. § 1.852-1(b) (1962).
79. LOIS YUROW, TIMOTHY W. LEVIN, W. JOHN MCGUIRE & JAMES M. STOREY, MUTUAL
FUND REGULATION AND COMPLIANCE HANDBOOK ch. 30 introd., Westlaw (database updated
Aug. 2017) (“It would create an insurmountable competitive disadvantage to the mutual fund
vehicle if its investment income were taxed to the fund . . . .”).
80. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
81. Id. at 431.
82. I.R.C. § 851(b)(2). There are also several closely related types of acceptable income,
including payments with respect to securities loans, foreign currency gains, and income from
certain publicly traded partnerships. Id.
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primarily as investment vehicles.83 Suppose that a mutual fund has an
unexpectedly stellar return from a nontraditional investment, so that
only 89 percent of its income qualifies.84 The mutual fund has clearly
failed the 90 percent income requirement, yet it does not lose its
favorable tax status. Instead, it must pay the government an excise tax
of the 1 percent of its income by which it failed the 90 percent income
requirement.85 This remedy is proportional to the scope of the violation
and fully compensates the government by turning over all income
earned in violation of the requirement. The mutual fund retains its
favorable tax status and does not face collapse on those grounds.86
In sum, every requirement imposed by tax law is enforced either
by a draconian property rule or by a compensatory liability rule.
Property rules do have potential benefits in tax law, including deterring
taxpayers from hard-to-detect violations and avoiding taxpayer
gamesmanship.87 But, as we shall see, property rules can bring ruin on
taxpayers unable to comply due to financial crises swirling around
them.88
C. Pliability Rules
Pliability rules are a straightforward yet powerful extension of the
property and liability rule concepts, introduced by Professors
Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky.89 A classic pliability rule
begins as a property rule and toggles to a liability rule when a triggering
event occurs.90
Pliability rules appear across many areas of law; for example, in
property law, the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment creates a
pliability rule.91 Landowners generally have a property-rule right to
exclude others. But if the land is needed for “public use,” which is the
83. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1192, at 10–11 (1976).
84. For example, the mutual fund might own substantial debt secured by real estate. If the
debt defaulted, foreclosure might result in the mutual fund owning real estate. Neither rental
income nor gains from selling property qualify towards the 90 percent requirement. See Hervey,
supra note 75, § V.J.
85. See I.R.C. § 851(i)(2). To be precise, the additional tax is ((100% – 89%) – (1/9 × 89%)).
Id.
86. See YUROW ET AL., supra note 79, at ch. 30 introd.
87. See, e.g., Blair-Stanek, supra note 9, at 1213–17.
88. See infra Part II.A.1.
89. See generally Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 10 (introducing pliability rules).
90. Id. at 5, 65. The term “pliability” comes from adding the “p” from property to “liability.”
See id. at 5.
91. U.S. CONST. amend. V.

BLAIR-STANEK IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1168

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

2/28/2018 10:42 PM

[Vol. 67:1155

triggering event, then the government can take the land in exchange
for “just compensation,” a liability rule.92
In corporate law, a shareholder’s entitlement to shares is
protected by a pliability rule.93 Normally shareholders have a propertyrule right in their shares and cannot be forced to sell their shares. But
during mergers, an acquiring corporation can force some shareholders
of the acquired corporation to sell their shares for a court-appraised
price,94 which is a liability rule.95
The doctrine of necessity discussed earlier is a pliability rule. In
normal times, dock owners have property-rule protection for their
docks.96 A boater that moors without the dock owner’s permission
faces severe remedies such as jail time, punitive damages, or forcible
expulsion.97 But necessity, such as a dangerous storm, triggers a shift to
a liability rule. A boater seeking shelter is entitled to temporarily use
the dock, per Ploof, but must compensate the dock owner for any
resulting damages, per Vincent. This pliability rule promotes both
efficiency and equity.
Efficiency is served because the pliability rule minimizes total
damage from the storm.98 Two types of damage are possible—harm to
the dock and harm to the boat, which includes harm to individuals
onboard. If the expected harm to the boat from not docking exceeds
the expected harm to the dock, the boater will rationally dock. But if
the expected harm to the dock from docking exceeds the expected
harm from not docking, the boater will, rationally, not dock.
Equity is also well served, as neither boaters nor dock owners
receive windfalls. The boater gets docking rights, but must pay
compensation to make the dock owner whole. This compensation
means that the doctrine of necessity is in no way a bailout for boaters.
Even if a policy serves both efficiency and equity, one must also
92. Id.; Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 10, at 59–60.
93. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 10, at 32–34.
94. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (2016) (describing appraisal rights).
95. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 10, at 32–34.
96. Id. at 51 n.180.
97. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 602(m), (o) (2016); Hillhouse v. Creedon, 169 S.W.3d 599,
602 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005) (providing for an injunction against a boat owner); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 77 (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (providing the general rule that “[a]n actor is
privileged to use reasonable force, not intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily harm,
to prevent or terminate another’s intrusion upon the actor’s land or chattels”).
98. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 225 (8th ed. 2011). When this
Article refers to “efficiency,” it refers to Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, maximizing total social welfare
of all involved parties.
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consider whether the policy creates moral hazard, which refers to “any
situation in which one person makes the decision about how much risk
to take, while someone else bears the cost if things go badly.”99 For
example, a homeowner with fire insurance may take less care to reduce
the risk of fire, knowing that the insurance company will cover losses
from any fire.100 By contrast, with the doctrine of necessity, the boater
decides how much risk to take by deciding whether to go sailing, and
also bears the cost if things go badly, as the boater must compensate
the dock owner under the liability rule established by Vincent. As a
result, the doctrine of necessity does not create moral hazard.
One oft-mentioned benefit of property rules is that the parties can
negotiate over the entitlement.101 In a theoretical world with zero
transaction costs, perfect information, and no strategic bargaining, tort
law could keep its property-rule protection for dock owners even
during storms. As the storm raged, dock owners and boaters could
negotiate the optimal solution to boat docking and price.
But this theoretical world obviously does not exist. During
negotiations the boat would probably wreck, which is inefficient. Even
if negotiations succeeded, the result would likely be extortionate
docking fees, which is inequitable. Temporarily shifting to liability
rules better serves both equity and efficiency.102Academics vehemently
debate the relative merits of property rules versus liability rules.103 But
there is consensus that tort law’s temporary switch to liability rules in
times of necessity is desirable.104 Liability rules make more sense than
property rules when negotiation is unlikely to produce an efficient and
equitable result.105
99. PAUL KRUGMAN, THE RETURN OF DEPRESSION ECONOMICS 63 (2009); accord
ROUBINI & MIHM, supra note 25, at 68; Joseph E. Stiglitz, Risk, Incentives and Insurance: The
Pure Theory of Moral Hazard, 8 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. 4, 6 (1983) (arguing that moral
hazard is the result of three factors, specifically risk, imperfect information, and “insurance,”
which covers a wide array of arrangements shifting risk from one party to another). See generally
Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237 (1996).
100. KRUGMAN, supra note 99, at 62–63.
101. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 9, at 1106 (“Why cannot a society simply . . . let its
transfer occur only through a voluntary negotiation? Why, in other words, cannot society limit
itself to the property rule?”).
102. Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of the Cathedral: The Dominance of Property Rules,
106 YALE L.J. 2091, 2092 (1997).
103. AYRES, supra note 61, at 183–200 (surveying the debate about property rules versus
liability rules).
104. Epstein, supra note 102, at 2108 (arguing strongly for the superiority of property rules,
but conceding that the doctrine of necessity’s temporary liability rules make sense).
105. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 9, at 1106 (“Often the cost of establishing the value of
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In general, switches from property rules to liability rules—that is,
pliability rules—make the most sense under three conditions.106 First
and most importantly, pliability rules handle substantially changed
circumstances,107 and make excellent responses to storms, quickspreading disease epidemics, and financial crises, all of which create
massively altered circumstances. Second, pliability rules can best
balance competing interests, including efficiency and fairness.108 Third,
pliability rules can serve a social goal, like efficiency, better than either
a pure property rule or a pure liability rule could.109 All three of these
considerations often weigh in favor of using pliability rules as responses
to storms, epidemics, and financial crises.
D. Pliability Rules: Fighting Epidemics and Financial Crises
Classic pliability rules, which temporarily move from property
rules to liability rules, are ideal for fighting crises in tax law and other
areas. Classic pliability rules have many advantages over the all-toocommon approach of moving from property rules to temporary
nonenforcement.110 The doctrine of necessity is one example, and Parts
II and III of this Article illustrate in depth why classic pliability rules
make sense in tax law. But pliability rules make sense for responding
to crises in many other areas of law, and a brief application of pliability
rules to constitutional law, bankruptcy law, and patent law shows the
desirability of pliability rules for crises in general, as a preview for a
more in-depth discussion related to tax law.
Constitutional law is the only area of law, other than tort law,
where scholars have investigated the use of pliability rules for
responding to crises.111 Constitutional law should respond to fast-

an initial entitlement by negotiation is so great that even though a transfer of the entitlement
would benefit all concerned, such a transfer will not occur.”).
106. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 10, at 66.
107. Id. at 67.
108. Id. at 67–68.
109. Id. at 68–69.
110. Bell and Parchomovsky term such moves from property rules to nonenforcement as
“zero order pliability rule[s].” Id. at 6, 30–31. This Article will simply refer to such moves as moves
to nonenforcement to keep the terminology simple. Furthermore, Bell and Parchomovsky would
use the term “multiple stage pliability rule” to describe the pliability rules that this Article
advocates—starting with a property rule, moving temporarily to a liability rule during a crisis, and
then returning to the original property rule after the crisis. Id. at 59 (discussing multiple stage
pliability rules). This Article will simply use the term “pliability rule” without the preceding words
“multiple stage.”
111. See, e.g., Kontorovich, supra note 37 (applying pliability rules to constitutional law’s
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spreading epidemics like Ebola and SARS with a pliability rule.112
Individuals are entitled to certain liberty interests113 that are generally
protected by property rules, with injunctions and jail time for those
who attempt to take away the entitlement.114 But this property rule
makes little sense during an epidemic, because quarantining infected
or likely infected individuals—that is, taking their liberty—prevents
greater social harm. For that reason, courts allow involuntary
quarantines, without any compensation to those quarantined.115 In
doing so, courts faced with quarantines take the lesson of Ploof, and do
not enforce property rules during crises, but they ignore the lesson of
Vincent, to replace the property rule with a compensatory liability rule.
Instead, constitutional law should use a pliability rule for fastspreading epidemics, permitting quarantines but requiring
compensation to those quarantined for their loss of liberty. Other
countries have used this approach; for example, both Taiwan and
Canada compensated individuals who were quarantined during the
2003 SARS outbreak.116
Just as constitutional law should respond with pliability rules for
epidemic crises, bankruptcy law should respond to financial crises with
pliability rules for the treatment of repurchase agreements, which are
often called “repos” for short, and which are a type of financial contract

handling of national security emergencies).
112. See generally id. (proposing using pliability rules to protect constitutional rights in
general, including in cases of mass detentions of people thought to be national security threats).
113. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV § 1.
114. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.3 (AM. LAW INST. 1962) (describing the crime of
false imprisonment).
115. Kontorovich, supra note 37, at 825 (“When an epidemic looms, the relevant individual
rights receive no protection at all.”); e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905)
(recognizing the “authority of a State to enact quarantine laws and ‘health laws of every
description’”).
116. Colin Perkel, SARS Patients Compensated, HAMILTON OBSERVER (Ont., Can.), June 14,
2003, at D1 (reporting Ontario’s payment of up to six thousand dollars in compensation to
quarantined persons); Richard Harris, Quarantine Effectiveness Under Scrutiny, ALL THINGS
CONSIDERED (Oct. 14, 2003) (noting that Taiwan paid quarantined persons a total of $17 million),
http://www.npr.org/programs/all-things-considered/2003/10/14/13063432/ [https://perma.cc/JH22A7C5].
U.S. courts could arguably implement a temporary liability rule for quarantines, without
any further legislative action, by interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) as requiring compensation
for those who are quarantined. Such judicial action would first require lifting the qualified
immunity that currently applies to government officials ordering quarantines. See Hickox v.
Christie, 205 F. Supp. 3d 579, 588–603 (D.N.J., 2016) (dismissing a nurse’s § 1983 claims for
involuntary quarantine for want of violation of clearly established law).
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that contributed to the 2008–09 financial crisis.117 Repos are a form of
secured borrowing commonly used between financial institutions,
using securities like mortgage-backed bonds as collateral.118 If the
debtor goes bankrupt, bankruptcy law lets the creditor immediately
seize and sell the collateral, without the debtor receiving the
protections normally given by bankruptcy law.119 The creditor thus has
property-rule protection. This rule may make sense during normal
times.120 But during financial crises, this property rule encourages and
enables “banks runs” on the debtor, as illustrated by the key role the
property rule played in the destruction of Lehman Brothers, which had
borrowed heavily using repos.121 Worse, creditors sell the seized
collateral—for example, mortgage-backed bonds—thus depressing the
market for those securities further and worsening the crisis.122

117. Edward R. Morrison, Mark J. Roe & Christopher S. Sontchi, Rolling Back the Repo Safe
Harbors, 69 BUS. LAW. 1015, 1015 (2014); Steven L. Schwarcz, Derivatives and Collateral:
Balancing Remedies and Systemic Risk, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 699, 716.
118. As described by the Third Circuit:
A standard repurchase agreement, commonly called a “repo,” consists of a two-part
transaction. The first part is the transfer of specified securities by one party, the dealer,
to another party, the purchaser, in exchange for cash. The second part consists of a
contemporaneous agreement by the dealer to repurchase the securities at the original
price, plus an agreed upon additional amount on a specified future date.
Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Mgmt. Corp. v. Spencer S&L Ass’n, 878 F.2d 742, 743 (3d Cir.
1989). This additional amount added to the price is the interest on the loan, and the securities are
the collateral for the loan. See Granite Partners, L.P. v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 17 F. Supp. 2d 275,
301 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); accord Nebraska Dept. of Revenue v. Loewenstein, 513 U.S. 123, 125 (1994).
Regarding the use of repos involving mortgage-backed securities as collateral, see Morrison et al.,
supra note 117, at 1015, 1017.
119. 11 U.S.C. § 559 (2012) (“[E]xercise of a contractual right of a repo participant or financial
participant to cause the liquidation, termination, or acceleration of a repurchase agreement . . .
shall not be stayed, avoided, or otherwise limited.”); see also id. § 362(b)(7), (o) (exempting repos
from bankruptcy’s automatic stay); id. § 546(f) (“the trustee may not avoid a transfer made by or
to (or for the benefit of) a repo participant”); id. § 548(d)(2)(C) (deeming that “a repo
participant . . . that receives a margin payment . . . or settlement payment . . . in connection with
a repurchase agreement, takes for value to the extent of such payment,” thus preventing repo
counterparties from being attacked under the fraudulent conveyance provisions).
120. Exploring Chapter 11 Reform: Corporate and Financial Institution Insolvencies;
Treatment of Derivatives, Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Regulatory Reform, Commercial
& Antitrust Law of the H. Comm. of the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 4 (2014) (statement of Seth
Grosshandler).
121. Morrison et al., supra note 117, at 1040–41; Schwarcz, supra note 117, at 716 (stating that
bankruptcy law rules on repos “explain the run on Lehman Brothers” at least in part).
122. See Brian Begalle, Antoine Martin, James McAndrews & Susan McLaughlin, The Risk
of Fire Sales in the Tri-Party Repo Market (2013), http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/
staff_reports/sr616.html [https://perma.cc/RMV4-4WWS]; Gaetano Antinolfi et al., Repos, Fire
Sales, and Bankruptcy Policy (Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi., Working Paper No. 2012-15, 2012),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2189583 [https://perma.cc/YN2T-X9R7]; Sebastian Infante, Repo
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Instead, during financial crises, the property-rule protection for
repo creditors should be turned into a liability rule. Creditors should
receive compensation based on the fair market value of the
collateral,123 plus a pro rata recovery from the debtor’s estate in
proportion to the loan amount not covered by the collateral’s value.124
This pliability rule would preserve the property-rule protection for
repo creditors during normal times, but it would allow for a move to
liability-rule protection to prevent bank runs during financial crises.
Unlike constitutional law and bankruptcy law, patent law has
already developed a rudimentary pliability rule for responding to
crises. Specifically, patent law has a pliability rule that can handle crises
like quick-spreading epidemics or bioterrorism that can be battled with
patented drugs. Patent holders often receive property-rule protection
in the form of an injunction against anyone infringing on their patent.125
But this protection becomes a liability rule in the form of compensatory
damages from infringers under certain circumstances, including when
such a switch would serve “the public interest.”126 Permitting
competitors to manufacture generic versions of patented drugs, with
compensation due to the patent holder, fully mobilizes society’s
resources to combat the epidemic or the bioterrorism—an excellent
result.127 This Article will draw lessons from the IRS’s responses to the
2008–09 financial crisis to propose concrete steps to further improve

Collateral Fire Sales: The Effects of Exemption from the Automatic Stay (Fed. Reserve Bd. Fin. &
Econ. Discussion Series No. 2013-83, 2013), http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2013/
201383/201383pap.pdf [https://perma.cc/SHS5-P324].
123. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) (“An allowed claim . . . is a secured claim to the extent of the value
of such creditor’s interest in the estate’s interest in such property . . . .”).
124. Id. (“[U]nsecured claim to the extent that the value of such creditor’s interest . . . is less
than the amount of such allowed claim.”); see 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 506.03 (16th ed.
2016). This liability rule is simply the default in bankruptcy law, once the special treatment for
repos is turned off.
125. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (noting that an injunction
will protect a patent under traditional principles of equity); id. at 395 (Roberts, C.J., concurring)
(“From at least the early 19th century, courts have granted injunctive relief upon a finding of
infringement in the vast majority of patent cases.”).
126. Id. at 391 (majority opinion). The Court also provided three other conditions, not
generally relevant to epidemics and bioterrorism, that may move protection from an injunction
to compensatory damages. Id.
127. See David B. Resnik & Kenneth A. De Ville, Bioterrorism and Patent Rights:
“Compulsory Licensure” and the Case of Cipro, 2 AM. J. BIOETH. 29, 32 (2002). The compulsory
licensing should include allowing imports of generic versions manufactured abroad, taking
advantage of worldwide capacity. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012) (providing that “import[ing] into
the United States any patented invention” is patent infringement).
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this pliability rule in patent law.128
II. THE IRS’S RESPONSES TO THE 2008–09 FINANCIAL CRISIS
This Part examines the IRS’s major responses to the 2008–09
financial crisis.129 First it considers the good responses, which moved
temporarily from property rules to liability rules.130 It goes into depth
analyzing one of the IRS’s good responses, involving mutual funds, to
demonstrate how moving to liability rules during crises has benefits
very similar to the doctrine of necessity.131 Indeed, in tax law such
moves have even greater benefits, including minimizing harm to third
parties and to the entire economy.132 This Part then considers the IRS’s
bad responses,133 which moved from property rules to nonenforcement,
thereby giving affected taxpayers windfalls and encouraging
unnecessary violations.
A. Good Responses: Temporary Moves from Property Rules to
Liability Rules
This Section discusses those instances when the IRS responded to
128. See infra Parts III.B.1, 4–6.
129. This Article does not discuss the IRS’s responses to the 2008–09 financial crisis that
merely clarified existing law or minimized procedural difficulties. E.g., I.R.S. Notice 2008-27,
2008-1 C.B. 543 (minimizing procedural difficulties in resolving auction-rate securities
difficulties); I.R.S. Notice 2008-41, 2008-1 C.B. 742 (same); I.R.S. Notice 2008-88, 2008-42 I.R.B.
933 (same); I.R.S. Notice 2008-55, 2008-27 I.R.B. 11 (clarifying classification as debt in specific
instance); I.R.S. Notice 2008-78, 2008-41 I.R.B. 851 (clarifying that responding to an unforeseen
crisis was not part of a “plan”); Rev. Proc. 2008-58, 2008-41 I.R.B. 856 (clarifying tax treatment
of certain securities-litigation settlements); Rev. Proc. 2009-10, 2009-2 I.R.B. 267 (clarifying tax
treatment of money market mutual fund sponsors’ payments to shore up funds); Rev. Proc. 200942, 2009-40 I.R.B. 459 (clarifying classification of mutual fund investments in bailout-related
vehicles). This Part also does not discuss IRS responses that were rendered irrelevant by
Congress, such as the IRS’s initial response to suspend the applicable high yield discount
obligation (AHYDO) rules that deny or delay deductions on certain debt instruments. Rev. Proc.
2008-51, 2008-35 I.R.B. 562 (rendered irrelevant by Pub. L. No. 111-5 §1232(c)(1), 123 Stat. 115,
341 (Feb. 17, 2009) (currently codified at I.R.C. § 163(e)(5)(F)(iii), (i)(1) (2012))); cf. NEW YORK
STATE BAR ASS’N, REPORT ON THE AHYDO RULES OF SECTIONS 163(E)(5) AND 163(I) at 5-6
(Mar. 10, 2017) [hereinafter AHYDO REPORT], https://www.stradley.com/~/media/Files/
Publications/2017/03/NYSBA-AHYDO.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NDW4-F67C]
(providing
background about AHYDO rules); id. at 7 (discussing Congress’s enactment of I.R.C.
§ 163(e)(5)(F)(iii) & (i)(1)). This Part also does not discuss IRS actions during the 2008–09
financial crisis that apply permanently. E.g., Rev. Proc. 2008-63, 2008-42 I.R.B. 946 (interpreting
how I.R.C. § 1058 applies when the taxpayer’s counterparty goes bankrupt).
130. See infra Part II.A.
131. See infra Part II.A.1.
132. See infra Part II.A.1.b.
133. See infra Part II.B.
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the financial crisis by shifting from a property rule to a liability rule,
temporarily. These responses employed the wisdom of both Ploof and
Vincent, albeit without the IRS acknowledging that it was taking an
approach perfected long ago in tort law. This Section begins with an indepth analysis of the IRS’s response to mutual fund distress.
1. Mutual Funds. Many date the start of the financial crisis to the
freezing of three mutual funds, run by the bank BNP Paribas, that
invested largely in subprime mortgage assets.134 Another pivotal
moment in the crisis came when the Reserve Primary mutual fund
announced substantial losses, after which “the dominoes started
falling.”135 Happily, the IRS’s ad hoc response to the tax problems
faced by troubled mutual funds mirrored the doctrine of necessity.
Recall that tax law requires mutual funds to distribute to their
investors at least 90 percent of their income each year,136 and that this
requirement is protected by a harsh property rule. In normal times, this
90 percent distribution requirement poses no problem. Many common
investment strategies cause mutual funds to recognize income on their
tax returns years before they actually receive cash.137 For example,
suppose that a mutual fund purchases a bond issued for $900 that
promises to repay $1000 at the bond’s maturity date. For each year
before the bond’s maturity date, the mutual fund must include a
portion of that $100 original issue discount as income, even though the
mutual fund receives none of that $100 in cash.138 Mutual funds using
these investment strategies can simply borrow cash to distribute to
shareholders to meet the 90 percent threshold.139

134. See, e.g., ALAN S. BLINDER, AFTER THE MUSIC STOPPED: THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, THE
RESPONSE, AND THE WORK AHEAD 90 (2014); Gregory Zuckerman, James R. Hagerty & David
Gauthier-Villars, Impact of Mortgage Crisis Spreads, WALL STREET J. (Aug. 10, 2007),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB118664884606092848 [http://perma.cc/ZGB6-S29N] (“The first
jolt came from French bank BNP Paribas . . . .”).
135. BLINDER, supra note 134, at 143.
136. I.R.C. § 852(a)(1) (2012).
137. Hervey, supra note 75, § VII.B (discussing “situations where [a mutual fund’s] cash flow
is less than taxable income”).
138. I.R.C. §§ 1272, 1273 (governing original issue discount); see BORIS I. BITTKER &
LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES, AND GIFTS ¶ 53.3 (1999 &
Supp. 2016) (providing a full overview of original issue discount); see also Hervey, supra note 75,
§ VII.B (noting that “original issue discount” can cause cash flow to be less than taxable income);
id. (noting that “[g]ains from futures contracts or options that are marked-to-market under §1256”
can also cause cash flow to be less than taxable income).
139. Hervey, supra note 75, § VII.B (noting that mutual funds “may have to sell assets or
borrow money in order to satisfy the requirement”).
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But the financial crisis created a cash crunch, making it extremely
difficult for mutual funds using such strategies to borrow money.140 As
a result, many mutual funds faced the prospect of failing the 90 percent
distribution requirement, which would have imperiled their existence.
The IRS came up with an ingenious response, temporarily turning
this property rule into a liability rule. The IRS promulgated guidance141
providing that if mutual funds distributed newly minted mutual fund
shares and a de minimis amount of cash,142 the newly minted shares
would count towards the 90 percent threshold.143 In effect, mutual
funds were allowed to conjure up paper distributions as needed to
avoid running afoul of the 90 percent distribution requirement. This
liability rule came with an explicit end date.144
The IRS thus created a temporary liability rule, because the newly
minted mutual fund shares created taxable income for investors in such
mutual funds.145 The IRS received additional tax proportional to the
amount by which a mutual fund fell below the 90 percent requirement,
fully compensating the government.
The IRS’s response kept any mutual fund from losing its favorable
tax status during the financial crisis.146 And because investors did not
fear such devastating status losses, the IRS helped maintain investor
confidence in mutual funds.147

140. All You Need Is Cash, ECONOMIST (Nov. 20, 2008), http://www.economist.com/node/
12637043 [https://perma.cc/U8DY-EL2Q].
141. Rev. Proc. 2009-15, 2009-4 I.R.B. 356, amplified and extended by Rev. Proc. 2010-12,
2010-3 I.R.B. 302 (extending this relief until Dec. 31, 2011).
142. Id. § 3(4) (requiring that actual cash be only 10 percent of the distributions deemed as
being paid).
143. See id. (relying on creative interpretations of I.R.C. § 305(b)(1) (2006) and Treas. Reg.
§§ 1.305-2(a), 1.305-1(b)(2) (as amended in 1973)).
144. Rev. Proc. 2009-15, 2009-4 I.R.B. 356 § 3.3 (applying to distributions “declared with
respect to a taxable year ending on or before December 31, 2009”). The IRS extended this relief
with Rev. Proc. 2010-12, 2010-3 I.R.B. 302 (extending relief until Dec. 31, 2011).
145. I.R.C. § 61(a)(7) (including dividends in gross income); Treas. Reg. § 1.305-2(a) (as
amended in 1973); Rev. Proc. 2009-15, 2009-4 I.R.B. 356 §§ 2.03–.04. Although this liability rule
lapsed at the end of 2011, the IRS in 2017 reintroduced this liability rule, making it permanent,
albeit with requirement of paying at least 20 percent of the dividend in cash. Rev. Proc. 2017-45,
2017-35 I.R.B. 216; see Matthew R. Madara, IRS Issues Guidance on Stock Distributions by REITs
and RICs, 156 TAX NOTES 921 (Aug. 21, 2017) (discussing the permanent ruling and how its
temporary predecessors had helped during the financial crisis).
146. A search of the SEC’s EDGAR database reveals no reports of any fund losing its tax
status.
147. While the federal government provided guarantees for a single category of mutual
funds—money market funds—it did not provide guarantees for other types of mutual funds, such
as stock mutual funds or bond mutual funds. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury,
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a. Minimizing Total Harm to Mutual Funds and Government. The
doctrine of necessity minimizes total harm to boaters and dock owners
from storms. In the same way, the IRS’s actions minimized total harm
from the financial crisis to the government, which is entitled to
taxpayer compliance, and to mutual funds, many of which could not
comply during the financial storm.
The harm to the government from a taxpayer violating a
requirement is best understood as the erosion of the relevant tax base.
The government relies on the existence of a corporate tax base on
which to levy the corporate tax.148 Absent the special favorable tax
provisions applicable to mutual funds, they would be included in that
base and properly taxed as corporations.149 The tax requirements
imposed on mutual funds, including the 90 percent distribution
requirement, exist to safeguard the government’s corporate tax base
by ensuring that mutual funds do not act like corporations carrying on
active businesses. Thus, when a mutual fund distributes less than the
required 90 percent, the corporate tax base is eroded, harming tax
revenue. The IRS’s crisis response created a liability rule that
compensated the government for the erosion to the corporate tax base
resulting from mutual funds not meeting the distribution requirements.
The harm to a mutual fund from losing its favorable tax status
would be immediate and severe—a “genuine disaster,” as one treatise
puts it.150 A mutual fund subject to full corporate taxation would
become an uneconomical investment vehicle,151 and investors would
rush to withdraw their money.152
Just as the doctrine of necessity creates incentives for boaters to
minimize the total damage caused by storms, the IRS’s move created
incentives for mutual funds to minimize the total damage caused by the
financial crisis. To the extent that a mutual fund lacked readily
Treasury Announces Temporary Guarantee Program for Money Market Funds (Sept. 29, 2008),
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp1161.aspx [https://perma.cc/5GF298DD].
148. MOLLY F. SHERLOCK & DONALD J. MARPLES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., OVERVIEW
OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM 9–11 (2014).
149. Compare I.R.C. § 851(a) (2012) (requiring that mutual funds receiving the favorable tax
status be a “domestic corporation”), with id. § 11 (imposing corporate tax on corporations).
150. YUROW ET AL., supra note 79, at ch. 30 intro.
151. Id. (“It would create an insurmountable competitive disadvantage to the mutual fund
vehicle if its investment income were taxed to the fund.”).
152. See John Morley & Quinn Curtis, Taking Exit Rights Seriously: Why Governance and Fee
Litigation Don’t Work in Mutual Funds, 120 YALE L.J. 84, 102–05 (2010) (providing an overview
of exit from mutual funds, also called open-ended investment funds).
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available cash to meet the 90 percent distribution requirement, the
fund’s investors had to pay additional tax to compensate the
government for the shortfall.153 Mutual funds had an incentive to use
this mechanism only to the extent that they genuinely needed it,
because its investors would not tolerate more taxation than absolutely
necessary.
Recall that the doctrine of necessity does not create moral hazard,
because boaters must pay compensation for any damage they cause by
taking advantage of the ability to dock.154 Similarly, the IRS’s move did
not create moral hazard, because a mutual fund’s investors had to
compensate the government to the extent that the mutual fund failed
the 90 percent distribution requirement.
b. Minimizing Financial Contagion. Moving tax law’s property
rules to liability rules temporarily during financial crises can have even
greater benefits than tort law’s similar shifts in response to storms. In
torts, the doctrine of necessity minimizes total harm to two parties,
such as the dock owner and the boater. In tax, a move to liability rules
during crises not only minimizes harm to the affected taxpayer and the
government, but also minimizes harm to third parties and the economy
as a whole. The interconnectedness of financial markets, financial
institutions like banks and mutual funds, and the broader economy
means that one institution’s distress can spread to others, a
phenomenon known as “financial contagion” by analogy to disease
epidemics.155
If the 90 percent distribution requirement had remained protected
by a property rule during the 2008–09 financial crisis, mutual funds
would have been forced to sell assets, either to scrounge up sufficient
cash to make the required distribution, or to liquidate after losing the
favorable tax status.156 Selling troubled assets during a financial crisis
increases supply and further depresses prices, and such “fire sales”
clearly worsen crises by also harming third parties who hold similar

153. See supra note 143.
154. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
155. OECD, FINANCIAL CONTAGION IN THE ERA OF GLOBALIZED BANKING 3 (2012),
https://www.oecd.org/eco/monetary/50556019.pdf [https://perma.cc/9LFT-VUFL]; David K.
Suska, Reappraising Dodd-Frank’s Living Will Regime, 36 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 779, 800
(2016).
156. For an explanation of the harms due to losing favorable tax status, see supra notes 150–
51.
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assets.157 Such fire sales are a key mechanism for financial contagion.158
The IRS’s temporary liability rule prevented tax-driven fire sales and
thus helped fight the crisis.
The temporary liability rule’s benefits likely extended well beyond
holders of distressed assets. For example, an individual who directly
owned the same stocks as a mutual fund—stocks that did not fall as
much in price as they might have if the mutual fund had been forced to
liquidate those assets in a fire sale—might have felt wealthier and thus
been more willing to buy roses at a local florist. The florist would thus
have been less likely to lay off workers.159
As another example, if a mutual fund had lost its favorable tax
status because the IRS had maintained the property-rule regime, the
mutual fund would likely have become insolvent, creating losses for
any banks from which the mutual fund had borrowed.160 Such losses
would in turn make those banks more likely to default on their own
obligations, and so on, spreading the contagion throughout the
financial system.161
In short, shifting temporarily from property rules to liability rules
not only resulted in the most efficient resolution between the taxpayer
and the government, but also prevented contagion from spreading to
third parties and the broader economy.
c. Preventing Windfalls. Recall that the doctrine of necessity is not
only efficient, but also equitable, because it prevents the undue
enrichment of dock owners and boaters alike.162 Tax law shifting to
liability rules during crises produces this same benefit. Liability rules
require the violating party to compensate the violated party. The
boater must compensate the dock owner for storm damage, and the
taxpayer must compensate the government for violating tax law
requirements during financial crises. For example, shifting the mutual
fund 90 percent distribution requirement to a liability rule required
157. See Morrison et al., supra note 117, at 1030–31 (discussing a growing body of evidence
showing how fire sales of assets can be a vector of financial contagion). For further discussion of
economists’ work on the topic, see supra note 122.
158. Morrison et al., supra note 117, at 1030–31.
159. See Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 14, at 490 (discussing the myriad, complex ways financial
contagion spreads to the real economy).
160. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18(f)(1) (2012) (allowing mutual funds to borrow from banks);
YUROW ET AL., supra note 79, § 13:2 (discussing mutual funds’ ability to take on embedded
leverage, including through certain investment transactions).
161. See Morrison et al., supra note 117, at 1030 (calling this “old-school contagion”).
162. See supra Part I.C.
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compensation to the government proportional to how far the taxpayer
fell below the threshold.163 In short, shifting a requirement from a
property rule to a liability rule is in no way a bailout for the taxpayer.
d. Infeasibility of Negotiation.
Another oft-mentioned
justification for property rules is that parties can simply negotiate an
alternative, optimal solution on their own.164 In tax law, the IRS and a
taxpayer can negotiate over the amount the taxpayer pays for violating
a requirement.165 But relying on the ability to negotiate around
property rules during emergencies has obvious limitations. Consider,
for instance, the implausibility of a dock owner and a boater
negotiating a docking arrangement as a storm rages.166 It is similarly
implausible to expect the IRS and taxpayers to negotiate efficient and
equitable solutions as a financial crisis rages.
Speedy responses are essential in fighting financial crises,167 but
the IRS moves slowly to negotiate settlements with taxpayers.168
During a crisis, the IRS cannot feasibly negotiate with each and every
taxpayer who violates a requirement—certainly not in time to avoid
serious harm to the taxpayers themselves, third parties, and the
broader economy. Sticking to the property rule and relying on IRS–
taxpayer negotiation is implausible and would cause unnecessary
harm. In short, relying on negotiation would be economically
inefficient.
Even if the IRS could work with unprecedented speed and

163. For an explanation of the IRS’s temporary liability rule, see supra notes 143–45 and
accompanying text.
164. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 9, at 1106 (“Why cannot a society simply . . . let its
transfer occur only through a voluntary negotiation? Why, in other words, cannot society limit
itself to the property rule?”).
165. Many such mechanisms exist. See MICHAEL I. SALTZMAN & LESLIE BOOK, IRS
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE ¶ 9.01 (2d ed. 2016) (explaining that the IRS’s appeals office
“receives well over one hundred thousand cases each year. Appeals officers negotiate and settle
85 to 90 percent of the cases with taxpayers”); id. ¶¶ 9.07–.09; see, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 7121, 7122; cf.
Shu-Yi Oei, Getting More by Asking Less: Justifying and Reforming Tax Law’s Offer-inCompromise Procedure, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1071, 1074 (2012) (discussing the current state of
taxpayer–IRS compromise); Shu-Yi Oei, Who Wins When Uncle Sam Loses? Social Insurance
and the Forgiveness of Tax Debts, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 421, 425 (2012) (analyzing the wider
effect of compromises and nonenforcement by the IRS).
166. See supra notes 101–05 and accompanying text.
167. PAULSON, supra note 28, at 244 (“[O]ur actions had to be decisive and overwhelming.”);
id. at 362 (“A financial institution could go under immediately if it lost the confidence of creditors
and clients.”); ROUBINI & MIHM, supra note 25, at 112–13.
168. See SALTZMAN & BOOK, supra note 165, ¶ 9.07 (giving overview of procedure).
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negotiate sufficiently prompt settlements with all affected taxpayers
during financial crises, the settlements would still vary widely based on
any given taxpayer’s luck and negotiating skill.169 Similarly situated
taxpayers would be treated differently, violating the tax law goal of
horizontal equity.170
In short, keeping property rules during financial crises and relying
on IRS–taxpayer negotiations would be worse for both efficiency and
equity than adopting a temporary liability rule.
2. Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs). Another good IRS
response to the 2008–09 financial crisis involved real estate investment
trusts (REITs). REITs enable average investors to buy into a
professionally managed, diversified real estate portfolio.171 While
mutual funds invest in stocks, bonds, and other securities, REITs invest
in real estate assets. In 2016, the 224 REITs traded on U.S. stock
markets had a total market capitalization of slightly over $1 trillion.172
REITs own a wide variety of real estate assets ranging from
warehouses and skyscrapers to mortgages and apartment buildings.173
REITs, like mutual funds, receive very favorable tax treatment,
provided that they meet certain requirements.
Just as mutual funds must distribute at least 90 percent of their
income to investors to retain favorable tax status, so must REITs
distribute at least 90 percent of their income to shareholders.174 As with
mutual funds, this requirement is protected by a property rule,
meaning REITs stand to lose their favorable tax status if they fail this
requirement. As with mutual funds, the financial crisis and its cash
crunch left many REITs unable to meet this requirement.175
169. See Blair-Stanek, supra note 9, at 1212–13 (“Different taxpayers will have different IRS
employees handling their cases. Some IRS employees will be much better negotiators than others,
capturing much different portions of the wide negotiating range between $0 and status-loss.”).
170. See BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 138, ¶ 3.1.4 (discussing horizontal equity).
171. H.R. REP. NO. 86-2020, at 3–4 (1960).
172. FTSE Nareit Real Estate Index Historical Market Capitalization, 1972, 2016, NAREIT,
https://www.reit.com/investing/industry-data-research/us-reit-industry-equity-market-cap
[https://perma.cc/5W6T-LYG2].
173. Nat’l Ass’n of Real Estate Inv. Trusts, Frequently Asked Questions About REITs,
NAREIT 2 (2011), http://www.reit.com/portals/0/PDF/2011FAQ.pdf [https://perma.cc/3WBQEGHK].
174. I.R.C. § 857(a)(1) (2012).
175. See D. Brock Griffiths, Guidance May Help REITs Conserve Cash, 36 REAL ESTATE
TAX’N 93, 93 (2009); id. at 96; Letter of Steven Wechsler, Nat’l Ass’n of Real Estate Inv. Trusts,
to Eric Solomon, Treasury Assistant Sec’y for Tax Policy (Oct. 31, 2008), reprinted in 2008 TAX
NOTES TODAY 221–33.
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The IRS responded by turning the property rule into a temporary
liability rule by permitting REITs to create paper dividends that were
taxable to shareholders but that counted towards the 90 percent
distribution requirement.176 As with mutual funds, the IRS’s actions
kept tax law from worsening the 2008–09 financial crisis for REITs,
while the tax imposed on a REIT’s shareholders on the paper dividends
prevented abuse or windfalls.177
3. Variable Annuities. Another good IRS response pertained to
annuities, which are an important retirement tool that gives retirees
periodic payments until death.178 Variable-contract annuities are a type
of annuity for which the amount of the periodic payment varies with
the performance of underlying investment assets.179 Variable-contract
annuities receive favorable tax treatment, subject to the requirement
that the investments be diversified into securities issued or guaranteed
by many different issuers.180 This diversification requirement is
protected by a property rule, with failure resulting in severe tax
consequences for the retiree, who must immediately include all income
from the underlying assets on his or her tax return.181
During the financial crisis, the Treasury gave a temporary federal
guarantee to many of the money market funds that were the underlying
investment behind variable-contract annuities.182 The federal
guarantee resulted in an unambiguous violation of the diversification
requirement, because the money market funds were invested 100
percent in securities backed by the federal government.183 The
property-rule remedy would normally result, but the IRS—which is a
part of the Treasury—issued administrative guidance temporarily

176. Rev. Proc. 2010-12, 2010-3 I.R.B. 302.
177. See Wechsler, supra note 175, at 5 (“This guidance would result in no revenue loss to the
fisc.”).
178. Variable Annuities: What You Should Know, SEC (Apr. 18, 2011), https://www.sec.
gov/reportspubs/investor-publications/investorpubsvaranntyhtm.html [https://perma.cc/PKD5VAHS] (“Variable annuities have become a part of the retirement and investment plans of many
Americans.”). See generally Vorris J. Blankenship, Retirement Tax Planning with Personally
Purchased Annuities, 113 TAX NOTES 459 (Oct. 30, 2006) (discussing the various types of
annuities and their tax treatment).
179. BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 138, ¶ 12.3.3.
180. I.R.C. § 817(h) (2012); Treas. Reg. § 1.817-5 (as amended in 2008).
181. Treas. Reg. § 1.817-5(a)(1).
182. See I.R.S. Notice 2008-92, 2008-43 I.R.B. 1001 § 1 (providing background).
183. Treas. Reg. § 1.817-5(h)(1)(i) (as amended in 2005).
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suspending it.184 The Treasury also charged a premium for the
guarantee,185 which compensated the government. The Treasury and
IRS thus temporarily moved the diversification requirement from a
property rule to a compensatory liability rule.
4. Municipal Bonds. The final example of a good IRS response,
shifting temporarily to liability rules, involved municipal government
bonds. These bonds give holders the extraordinary tax benefit that the
interest they pay is excluded from the bondholder’s gross income.186
This is an exception to the general rule that interest, such as interest
earned on a bank savings account or a corporate bond, is taxable
income.187 Municipal bonds lose their tax exemption if they are
guaranteed, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, by the federal
government.188 Losing this tax exemption would be devastating to the
government that issued the bonds and to bondholders, such that a
leading commentator likened that consequence to “the death
penalty.”189 In short, a property rule protects the requirement that
municipal bonds cannot be federally guaranteed.
Money market funds can hold municipal bonds, and the investors
in these funds receive the interest tax free.190 But during the 2008–09
financial crisis, the Treasury temporarily guaranteed many tax-exempt
money market funds, which would have triggered the property rule
against any federal guarantees of a municipal bond, with devastating
consequences.191 The IRS prevented this result by issuing
administrative guidance suspending this property rule remedy.192 In its
place, the Treasury charged a premium for the guarantee,193 which
compensated the government. Thus, the no-federal-guarantee rule was
shifted, temporarily, from a property rule to a liability rule.

184. I.R.S. Notice 2008-92, 2008-43 I.R.B. 1001.
185. Id. § 2.01 (“Participating money market funds are required to make premium payments
to participate in the Program.”).
186. I.R.C. § 103 (2012).
187. See I.R.C. § 61(a)(4) (including interest in the general definition of gross income).
188. I.R.C. § 149(b).
189. BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 138, ¶ 15.1.2.
190. I.R.C. § 852(b)(5).
191. See I.R.C. § 149(b) (2006).
192. I.R.S. Notice 2008-81, 2008-41 I.R.B. 852.
193. Id. § 2.01 (“Participating money market funds are required to make premium payments
to participate in the Program.”).
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B. Bad Responses: Temporary Moves to Nonenforcement for
Property Rules.
This Section describes the IRS’s five moves from property rules to
total nonenforcement during the 2008–09 financial crisis. Given the
speed with which the crisis unfolded, this simplistic approach was
understandable. But these moves had serious drawbacks that imposed
substantial costs on the economy, including unnecessary layoffs and
home foreclosures.
1. Short-Term Loans from Foreign Subsidiaries. During the crisis,
the IRS partially stopped enforcing rules restricting the ability of U.S.
corporations to access cash belonging to their foreign subsidiaries.
From the inception of the corporate tax until the passage of tax reform
in late 2017,194 U.S. corporations generally owed no U.S. tax on income
that their foreign subsidiaries earned by operating in foreign countries,
as long as the cash the foreign subsidiary earned abroad was not
brought back to the U.S. parent corporation.195 A foreign subsidiary
might have repatriated cash back to the U.S. parent, thereby incurring
U.S. taxes, by paying a straightforward dividend or by loaning the cash
to the U.S. parent. Section 956 of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code
(IRC) would impose full, immediate U.S. taxation on loans to a U.S.
parent from its foreign subsidiaries.196 Section 956 was a property rule

194. Pub. L. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017).
195. BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 138, ¶ 65.1.4; S. REP. No. 87-1881 (1962), reprinted in
1962-3 C.B. 703, 784-85 (discussing this “tax deferral” and Congress’s enactment in 1962 of some
limited exceptions to tax deferral, including what would be codified at I.R.C. § 956 (1964)). When
the cash was repatriated, the U.S. corporation often received a credit for foreign income taxes
paid. BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 138, ¶ 72.1; I.R.C. § 902 (2006). In late 2017, Congress
passed the most fundamental changes ever to the U.S. tax rules governing foreign activities of
U.S. corporations, imposing a one-time repatriation tax on foreign subsidiaries’ overseas earnings
and then exempting taxation of money from foreign subsidiaries going forward. Pub. L. 115-97 §
14101 (codified at I.R.C. § 245A (2012)); id. § 14103 (codified at I.R.C. §§ 965, 78, 904, 907); see
H.R. REP. No. 115-466 at 598–99 (discussing new I.R.C. § 245A (2012)); id. at 613, 618 (discussing
one-time repatriation tax).
196. I.R.C. § 956(a) (2006), (c)(1)(C); id. § 951(a)(1)(B). The amount of the loan is measured
only at the end of each of the foreign subsidiary’s quarters, although a series of loans that end
before the quarter-end and restart after the quarter-end would likely be recharacterized as, in
substance, a loan. Rev. Rul. 89-73, 1989-1 C.B. 258; Jacobs Eng’g Grp., Inc. v. United States, No.
CV 96-2662, 1997 WL 314167, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 1997), aff’d, 168 F.3d 499 (9th Cir. 1999)
(unpublished table decision). Although § 956 was not amended by the 2017 tax reform legislation,
Pub. L. 115-97, the substantial changes to the U.S. international tax rules in that legislation, see
supra note 195, have rendered § 956 largely irrelevant or, if anything, a tool that taxpayers can
use to reduce their tax bill. Andrew Velarde, Bottom Line: 956 Doesn’t Have Much Impact After
Reform, 2018 WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY 12-6 (Jan. 18, 2018).
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against such loans, since zero U.S. tax is due otherwise,197 and the rule
could cause an infinite jump in taxes for such a loan.198 As the chief
executive officer of one large company explained in 2008, these U.S.
tax rules created an incentive against “repatriating even a penny of
foreign profits.”199 To avoid triggering this property rule, U.S.
corporations had stored over $1 trillion in cash in foreign subsidiaries
by the height of the crisis in 2008.200
The most destructive aspect of the 2008–09 financial crisis was its
severe cash crunch, which left many U.S. corporations unable to
borrow from banks or financial markets to meet regular cash needs,
like paying employee salaries.201 A simple solution could have been to
enable U.S. corporations to borrow temporarily from the $1 trillion in
cash held by their foreign subsidiaries. But § 956’s property rule
impeded companies from using this solution.

197. If a foreign subsidiary’s earnings remained indefinitely offshore, never subject to U.S.
tax, then the present value of the future taxes that would have had to be paid was close to zero.
Moreover, the foreign subsidiary’s earnings might have largely escaped U.S. tax by a tax holiday,
as with Internal Revenue Code § 965 (2006), or by a corporate “inversion,” whereby the parent
corporation merges with a foreign corporation that is not subject to U.S. tax.
198. A 35 percent U.S. tax on a foreign subsidiary’s earnings is infinitely higher than a 0
percent U.S. tax on the same earnings.
199. James Tisch, Letter to the Editor, The Taxation of Overseas Earnings Creates Incentives,
WALL STREET J., July 5, 2008, at A10. Section 956 influenced U.S. corporations’ behavior both in
terms of cash taxes owed to the U.S. government and the financial accounting for taxes. See John
R. Graham, Michelle Hanlon & Terry Shevlin, Real Effects of Accounting Rules: Evidence from
Multinational Firms’ Investment Location and Profit Repatriation Decisions, 49 J. ACCT. RES. 137,
181 (2011) (surveying U.S. corporations’ tax executives, and finding that “the importance of the
financial accounting tax expense deferral is not statistically different from the importance of cash
tax deferral”). For financial accounting purposes, Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 23
(APB 23) provided that U.S. taxes due on foreign subsidiary income were not included as an
expense if the corporation stated that the earnings were “permanently reinvested,” meaning that
U.S. tax would not have been due on those earnings for an indefinite period of time, which in turn
means that they would not have been paid to the U.S. parent via dividend or a loan subject to
§ 956. SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, EXHIBITS TO HEARING ON
OFFSHORE PROFIT SHIFTING AND THE U.S. TAX CODE 15–16 (2012) [hereinafter SENATE PSI
REPORT], http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/ ?id=7B9717AF-592F-48BE-815B-FD8D38A7
1663 [https://perma.cc/JLL2-RUPN]; see also FASB, Accounting for Income Taxes, Special Areas
(ASC 740-30-25) (codifying APB 23). Section 956 arguably does have loopholes that companies
exploited, but these tactics were legally dubious. SENATE PSI REPORT, supra, at 14–15, 24–27.
200. Overseas Earnings of Russell 1000 Tops $2 Trillion in 2013, AUDIT ANALYTICS tbl. (Apr.
1, 2014), http://www.auditanalytics.com/blog/overseas-earnings-of-russell-1000-tops-2-trillion-in2013/ [https://perma.cc/DQB9-TFX2] (listing total foreign indefinitely reinvested earnings at
$1,098,470,000,000 as of 2008). The amount of cash held by foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies
only grew after 2008 and was estimated at $2.6 trillion for 2015. Letter from Joint Committee on
Taxation Staff to Reps. Kevin Brady & Richard Neal (Aug. 31, 2016), in 2016 TNT 190-22.
201. All You Need is Cash, supra note 140.
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To allow U.S. parent companies to borrow from their foreign
subsidiaries during the crisis, the IRS’s response was temporary
nonenforcement of § 956, but only for 179 days out of the year.202 While
this nonenforcement likely helped many corporations—and jobs—
survive the financial crisis, it was rightly criticized as a windfall for
many other corporations,203 because corporations could violate § 956
for up to 179 days per year regardless of whether they faced a cash
crunch.204
Yet many distressed U.S. corporations could not meet their cash
needs with loans lasting just 179 days out of the year.205 They needed
cash for operating expenses, such as paying employees, throughout the
whole year. But the IRS could not countenance extending its
nonenforcement beyond 179 days, to avoid giving too great a windfall
to corporations that did not need the relief.
A better alternative would have been a temporary shift to a
liability rule that would have allowed U.S. corporations to borrow cash
from their foreign subsidiaries while properly compensating the
government. This compensation would have been equal to interest206
on the amount of tax the U.S. parent would have owed if § 956 applied
in full. For example, suppose that during the 2008–09 financial crisis, a
cash-strapped U.S. corporation borrowed $100 million from its foreign
202. I.R.S. Notice 2008-91, 2008-43 I.R.B. 1001, extended by I.R.S. Notice 2009-10, 2009-5
I.R.B. 419, extended by I.R.S. Notice 2010-12, 2010-4 I.R.B. 326. Specifically, the loans could be
for a maximum of 60 days at a time, with loans outstanding from a foreign subsidiary for less than
180 days total per year. Id. § 2. This guidance applied for the first two taxable years of a foreign
corporation ending after October 3, 2008. Id. § 3.
203. See, e.g., Lee A. Sheppard, Subpart F and the Credit Meltdown, 121 TAX NOTES 127, 127
(2008).
204. None of the IRS notices imposed a requirement that the taxpayer taking advantage of
the requirement be facing cash shortages. See supra note 202.
205. See Stuart R. Lipeles & John D. McDonald, The Treasury Relaxes Code Sec. 956 During
Crisis, 87 TAXES 5, 7 (2009); id. at 8 (“Notice 2008-91 . . . is, however, an incremental step that is
not likely to make a dramatic impact. If the Treasury really wants to have a significant impact and
help taxpayers that are having severe problems obtaining credit, it should . . . change the 60-/180day thresholds to something significantly longer.”); see also Ron Dabrowski & Alexey Manasuev,
Liquidity, Certainty, and Rollover Loans: Notice 2008-91 and Relief From IRC Section 956, 57
TAX NOTES INT’L 793, 799–800 (2010) (the notice’s 180-day time limit “may not allow taxpayers
to fully benefit from the ‘liquidity relief’” intended by the notice).
206. The IRS already regularly calculates and publishes interest rates for use by taxpayers on
underpayments of taxes, which is a similar situation. See I.R.C. § 6621(a)–(b) (2012). Professor
Shu-Yi Oei has correctly noted that interest rates should be adjusted for riskiness and that
governments cannot feasibly figure out each taxpayers’ riskiness and appropriate interest rate.
See Shu-Yi Oei, Taxing Bankrupts, 55 B.C. L. REV. 375, 400 (2014). But this concern is minimal
here because the taxpayer has a much larger pot of cash available for payment, specifically the
cash being loaned by the foreign subsidiary.
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subsidiary for one year, and that § 956 would normally result in tax of
$35 million.207 If the relevant interest rate was 10 percent,208 this
proposed liability rule would have required the U.S. parent to pay $3.5
million in additional taxes per year to compensate for violating § 956.
Switching temporarily to this liability rule during the financial
crisis would have had three practical benefits. First, it would have
prevented windfalls to corporations that did not need the relief.
Second, because the compensation would have been proportional to
the time the loan was outstanding, a parent corporation would have
had an incentive to repay the loan from its subsidiary once the parent’s
cash crunch ended. Third, the compensation to the government would
have made it palatable for policymakers to provide year-round relief
throughout the crisis, rather than the 179-day relief that the IRS
actually provided and that was insufficient for many companies.209
This liability rule would almost certainly have saved jobs had it
been in place during the 2008–09 financial crisis, because it would have
provided many hard-hit companies with sufficient access to cash. The
layoffs during the 2008–09 financial crisis resulted in large part from
nonfinancial businesses lacking cash.210 A survey of chief financial
officers of U.S. nonfinancial companies during the crisis found that
those facing serious financial constraints planned substantial cuts in
investment,211 which would reduce demand for investment in the short
term and reduce productivity in the long term. Even more ominously,
these cash-strapped companies also reported planning to slash their
U.S. workforces by an average of 11 percent.212
2. Foreign Subsidiary Loans for Securities Dealers. The previous
Section discussed how the IRS did not enforce § 956 during the 2008–
207. This is calculated using the then-applicable 35 percent corporate tax rate applied to the
loan amount. I.R.C. § 11. The U.S. parent’s tax due might have been lowered by the credit for any
foreign taxes paid. See supra note 195. Assume for simplicity that the subsidiary paid zero foreign
taxes through sophisticated tax planning.
208. For a discussion of the IRS’s ability to charge interest rates on underpayments of taxes,
see supra note 206.
209. For a discussion of the insufficiency of the IRS’s relief for many companies, see supra
note 205.
210. Murillo Campello, John R. Graham & Campbell R. Harvey, The Real Effects of Financial
Constraints: Evidence from a Financial Crisis, 97 J. FIN. ECON. 470, 477 (2010); All You Need is
Cash, supra note 140; cf. PAULSON, supra note 28, at 227–28 (noting the connection between
companies’ lack of access to cash and job cuts).
211. Campello et al., supra note 210, at 478.
212. Id. fig.2. By comparison, otherwise comparable firms facing less dire financial constraints
planned an average workforce reduction of just 3 percent. Id.
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09 financial crisis, but limited this nonenforcement to 179 days per year.
The IRS also made another, quite different shift to not enforcing § 956;
this shift applied solely to securities dealers. The IRS allowed U.S.
securities dealers to borrow cash from their foreign subsidiaries—with
no time limit.213
Section 956 has an exception that allows securities dealers to
borrow money tax free from their foreign subsidiaries, provided that
the collateral backing the loan is “readily marketable securities.”214
This “readily marketable” requirement is protected by a property rule,
so that using securities that are not readily marketable as collateral
results in the full amount of the loan from the foreign subsidiary being
taxable under § 956’s general rule of immediate full taxation of the loan
amount.215
During the financial crisis, the IRS shifted to nonenforcement of
the “readily marketable” requirement.216 U.S. securities dealers held
piles of securities, like dubious mortgage-backed bonds, for which no
ready market existed,217 because market participants suspected the
securities had little value or were even worthless. The IRS’s
nonenforcement allowed securities dealers to use those securities as
collateral to borrow cash from their foreign subsidiaries without any
time limit.
Perversely, this slapdash move to nonenforcement created
ambiguity and risk for the very U.S. securities dealers that the IRS
hoped to benefit, because a related statutory provision limited the tax
exclusion “to the extent the principal amount of the [cash borrowed]

213. Rev. Proc. 2008-26, 2008-21 I.R.B. 1014, extended by I.R.S. Notice 2009-10, 2009-5 I.R.B.
419, extended by I.R.S. Notice 2010-12, 2010-4 I.R.B. 326. The guidance theoretically applied to
not only securities dealers, but also commodities dealers. But the guidance talks about secured
borrowings involving securities, suggesting it applied overwhelmingly to securities dealers in
practice.
214. I.R.C. § 956(c)(2)(J) (2006); see S. REP. No. 105-33, at 87–89 (1997). Congress passed this
statute to enable cross-border lending between U.S. securities dealers and unrelated foreign
parties, using the securities dealers’ foreign subsidiaries as middlemen to ease the nontax aspects
of the transaction. See Philip Fried & Kevin J. Liss, CFCs—Investment of Earnings in United States
Property, U.S. International Portfolios (BNA) No. 6260-1st, § VI.D (1st ed. 2014). But the statute
does not actually require that an unrelated foreign party be involved.
215. I.R.C. § 956(c)(1)(C) (defining “an obligation of a United States person,” which includes
a loan obligation of the U.S. parent corporation, as “United States property”).
216. Rev. Proc. 2008-26, 2008-1 C.B. 1014 § 4; see also supra note 213.
217. Rev. Proc. 2008-26, 2008-21 I.R.B. 1014. (“For example, the Service will not challenge
whether a mortgage-backed security . . . is ‘readily marketable . . . .’”); cf. Sullivan & Sheppard,
supra note 24, at 14 (discussing Rev. Proc. 2008-26 and how it would be applied to “the toxic asset
in question”).
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does not exceed the fair market value” of the securities used as
collateral.218 But the “fair market value” of these securities was
completely unclear because the securities were not “readily
marketable.”219 Years later, the IRS could potentially audit a securities
dealer and argue that a security’s fair market value was substantially
less than the cash borrowed from the foreign subsidiary using that
security as collateral. The securities dealer would then owe tax on the
difference.
The IRS did not stop enforcing this “fair market value” limitation,
because doing so would have been equivalent to total nonenforcement
of § 956 for securities dealers, allowing them to repatriate nearly
unlimited cash, tax free.220 To avoid giving such a generous unlimited
windfall, the IRS moved to nonenforcement of only the “readily
marketable” requirement. This half-hearted muddle by the IRS left
ambiguity and risk, which kept many securities dealers from
benefitting from it.221
A better solution would have been temporarily moving to the
same liability rule proposed in the previous Section—letting all U.S.
corporations, not just securities dealers, borrow as much money from
their foreign subsidiaries as they wanted, but requiring the
corporations to compensate the government in proportion to the
amount and length of the loan.222 That straightforward compensation
formula would not have created severe legal uncertainty, unlike the
IRS’s ad hoc nonenforcement of the “readily marketable”
requirement.
3. Bank Tax Attributes—A Windfall for Walls Fargo. During the
crisis, the IRS stopped enforcing some of the rules against corporations
abusing “tax attributes.” When a corporation loses money or purchases
assets that later fall in value, the result is a tax attribute that the
corporation can use to shelter income in future years.223 The Supreme
218. I.R.C. § 956(c)(2)(J).
219. See supra note 217.
220. During the financial crisis, plenty of securities were available to purchase for a fraction
of their face value. If the IRS had waived the fair market value limitation, a securities dealer could
use just $1 million in U.S. cash to purchase subprime mortgage bonds with a face value of $100
million, and use them as collateral to repatriate $100 million tax free from a foreign subsidiary.
221. Sullivan & Sheppard, supra note 24, at 14 (noting that Revenue Procedure 2008-26 would
likely have limited effect, since “[s]ection 956(c)(2)(J) does say that the borrower cannot borrow
more than the fair market value of the toxic asset in question”).
222. See supra notes 206–07 and accompanying text.
223. One type of tax attribute is the “net operating loss” (NOL), effectively representing a
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Court explained that such tax attributes “were designed to permit a
taxpayer to set off its lean years against its lush years.”224
Tax attributes can, however, create perverse incentives to engage
in corporate acquisitions that would not happen without the tax
attributes. A corporation with lots of income might try to shelter its
own future income by acquiring a company with lots of tax attributes.
Permitting such tax-motivated acquisitions would distort acquisition
decisions and enable acquiring corporations to shelter their income
from tax.225
Congress responded to this concern by enacting § 382 of the
IRC.226 When one corporation acquires another,227 § 382 places strict
limits on the use of tax attributes to shelter future income. Each year,
the amount of tax attributes that can be used is set by a simple formula,
multiplying the tax-exempt interest rate at the time of the acquisition228
by the value of all the acquired company’s stock—that is, its stock
market capitalization—at the time of the acquisition.229 Therefore, the
smaller the acquired company’s stock market capitalization, the less
the acquirer may use acquired tax attributes to reduce its income.
During the 2008–09 financial crisis, this simple formula became a
draconian property rule against acquiring troubled banks. Bank stocks
plunged, which proportionally reduced § 382’s annual tax-attribute
usage limit.230 Meanwhile banks’ tax attributes soared, as they lost ever
year’s negative taxable income. I.R.C. § 172. Another type of tax attribute is a “net unrealized
built-in loss,” which basically means that the corporation paid more for its assets than they are
now worth. Id. § 382(h)(3)(A)(i). The corporation can often deduct losses by recognizing them,
such as by selling them or, if the corporation is a bank, by charging them off to reflect its inability
to collect from the borrowers. See Treas. Reg. § 1.166-2(d) (as amended in 1993).
224. United States v. Foster Lumber Co., 429 U.S. 32, 42 (1976) (quoting Libson Shops, Inc.
v. Koehler, 353 U.S. 382, 386 (1957)).
225. AM. LAW INST., FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT, SUBCHAPTER C 208-09 (1982).
226. I.R.C. § 382 (2012); see H.R. REP. No. 99-841, at 170–96 (1986) (Conf. Rep.).
227. Acquisition generally involves purchasing a majority of the acquiree’s stock. See I.R.C.
§ 382(g).
228. I.R.C. § 382(f). This is typically the prevailing rate for low-risk municipal bonds, the
interest on which is exempt from any federal income tax. This rate is calculated and published
every month by the IRS in the Internal Revenue Bulletin. See generally BORIS I. BITTKER &
JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS ¶
14.44[1][b] (7th ed. 2014) (“The exempt rate was apparently chosen in an attempt to offset any
overvaluation of the corporation because of anticipated tax benefit from the future use of the
losses.”).
229. I.R.C. § 382(b), (e)(1); BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 228, ¶ 14.44[1][b].
230. The statutory language setting out the limitation formula, I.R.C. § 382(b)(1), looks to
stock valuation, even if that valuation has plunged due to temporary factors. See Berry Petroleum
Co. v. Comm’r, 104 T.C. 584, 637–40 (1995), aff’d, 142 F.3d 442 (9th Cir. 1998).
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more money and the value of their loans and other assets plunged.
Consider a simple hypothetical with banks X and Y buffeted by
the financial crisis. In late 2008, each bank had $20 billion in tax
attributes. Both expected to return to profitability with $10 billion in
profits per year in 2010 and 2011 for each bank. Standing alone, X and
Y can each avoid paying any taxes in 2010 or 2011, using their own tax
attributes, because $10 billion of the tax attributes completely offset
the $10 billion in profits in 2010, and the remaining $10 billion in tax
attributes completely offset the $10 billion in profits in 2011. But
suppose that the financial crisis drove Y’s stock market capitalization
down to just $1 billion in late 2008. At that time, the tax-exempt
interest rate was around 5 percent.231 If X acquired Y in late 2008, then
the combined bank would have to pay tax on $9.95 billion232 in both
2010 and 2011. But without the acquisition neither would have paid any
taxes in either year.
Section 382 thus became a draconian property rule against bank
mergers, even when such mergers would increase financial stability,
prevent bank runs, and be economically beneficial.233 The IRS correctly
diagnosed this problem but promptly delivered the wrong cure—
nonenforcement.234 The IRS issued guidance that § 382 would simply
not apply to most tax attributes of acquired banks.235
In late 2008, the bank Wachovia had approximately $74 billion in
tax attributes.236 Just two days after the IRS guidance, the bank Wells
Fargo announced that it would acquire Wachovia.237 One industry

231. Rev. Rul. 2008-53, 2008-49 I.R.B. 1231 tbl.3 (promulgating the long-term tax-exempt rate
for ownership changes in December 2008 as 5.40 percent).
232. The 5 percent tax-exempt rate multiplied by the $1 billion price of the target allows the
merged bank to subtract only $0.05 billion of the target’s tax attributes—and all $10 billion of
acquirer’s tax attributes—against their combined $20 billion in income, leaving $9.95 billion as
taxable income.
233. Some commentators have reasonably argued that two banks merging often results in
more stability primarily because it ensures too-big-to-fail status. E.g., ROUBINI & MIHM, supra
note 25, at 224. But the Wells Fargo–Wachovia merger has apparently resulted in cost savings and
better customer coverage. See Matthias Rieker, Wells Fargo’s Results Show More Benefits of
Wachovia Deal, WALL STREET J. (Jan. 21, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527
48704590704576091663157991174 [https://perma.cc/3BMR-X7PM].
234. Cf. Lawrence Zelenak, Custom and the Rule of Law in the Administration of the Income
Tax, 62 DUKE L.J. 829, 831, 845–46 (2012) (observing that the IRS’s nonenforcement of the tax
attribute rules had some precedent in the IRS’s nonenforcement in more mundane areas, like
fringe benefits).
235. I.R.S. Notice 2008-83, 2008-42 I.R.B. 905 (Oct. 20, 2008).
236. Let Uncle Sam Pay for Your Acquisition, HOVDE INDUSTRY UPDATE, Jan. 2009, at 2.
237. Binyamin Appelbaum, After Change in Tax Law, Wells Fargo Swoops In, WASH. POST
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analyst calculated that the IRS’s nonenforcement saved Wells Fargo
$22.5 billion in taxes after the Wachovia acquisition.238 Other banks
that acquired struggling banks also likely benefitted from this
nonenforcement.239 This largess drew criticism not only from scholars
and tax commentators,240 but also from a bipartisan congressional
chorus.241 Congress took the unusual step of repealing the IRS
guidance, although Congress grandfathered in already-announced
acquisitions like Wells Fargo and Wachovia.242 Instead of
nonenforcement, the IRS should have shifted temporarily to a liability
rule that compensated the government by limiting tax attributes, but
with the limit calculated using the target’s market capitalization before
the crisis started,243 rather than the normal rule of using the target’s
market capitalization at the time of the acquisition.244 The limit would
remain the tax-exempt interest rate multiplied by the target’s market
capitalization,245 but the target’s market capitalization would be
measured as of before the crisis, rather than the time of the acquisition,
by which time the target’s stock would have plunged.246 This rule would
still prevent garden-variety tax-motivated acquisitions, because a

(Oct. 4, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/10/03/AR200810030
1042.html [https://perma.cc/KK9M-LLND].
238. Let Uncle Sam Pay for Your Acquisition, supra note 236, at 3. This analysis reasonably
assumed a 33 percent effective tax rate. Id.
239. Id.
240. E.g., Lee A. Sheppard, Technical Objections to the Bailout, 121 TAX NOTES 20, 25 (2008)
(“Even bank representatives were bowled over by the generosity of this notice.”); Thomas R.
May, IRS Addresses Loss Limitations Amid Financial Crisis, 121 TAX NOTES 277, 279–80 (2008);
Zelenak, supra note 24.
241. May, supra note 240, at 280 (noting that Senator Charles Grassley (R-Iowa) criticized
the Notice because it “likely will add billions of dollars to the deficit”); Chuck O’Toole, Baucus
Calls for Special Inspector General to Look into Notices, 121 TAX NOTES 883 (2008) (quoting
Senator Max Baucus (D-Mont.)). The treasury inspector general found no ethical improprieties,
only questionable policy. Memorandum from Rich Delmar, Counsel to Inspector Gen., Dep’t of
the Treasury, to Eric M. Thorson, Inspector Gen., Dep’t of the Treasury (Sept. 3, 2009),
http://www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-structure/ig/Documents/Inquiry%20Regard
ing%20IRS%20Notice%202008-83.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q4QM-99EQ].
242. American Recovery & Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1261, 123 Stat.
115, 342.
243. Determining when a crisis starts is the subject of Part III.B.5 below.
244. I.R.C. § 382(e)(1) (2012) (providing the rule that the value of the target corporation is
measured “immediately before the ownership change”).
245. Id. § 382(b)(1) (setting out this formula).
246. Other compensatory liability rules are also possible that would keep § 382 from
becoming a property rule against acquiring troubled companies during a crisis. For example, §
382’s limit could be applied only to tax attributes that arose before the financial crisis; thus, the
acquirer could use all tax attributes that arose once the financial crisis started.
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company that was losing money—and thus generating tax attributes—
before the crisis started would have had a correspondingly low precrisis
stock price. But the fall in a company’s stock price resulting from the
crisis would not turn the § 382 limitation from a liability rule into a
draconian property rule against all acquisitions.
This proposed liability rule would ensure that tax law does not
prevent acquisitions that would help stop a financial crisis. This liability
rule would also prevent windfalls by preventing acquiring corporations
from sheltering their future income using tax attributes already
reflected as losses that depressed the target corporation’s stock price
before the crisis started.
4. Tax Attributes During Bailouts—A Windfall for General
Motors. The IRC section just discussed, § 382, is not limited to
acquisitions of already-existing stock, like Wachovia’s stock in the
example above. Section 382 also applies to acquiring new stock issued
in exchange for putting more money into a corporation with tax
attributes.247
Consider a simple hypothetical where large investors are
considering putting new capital either into company A or into company
B. Suppose that B’s business opportunities are more economically
promising than A’s business opportunities, meaning that investors and
the economy would benefit more from investing in B. But suppose that
B has no tax attributes, while A does have tax attributes, which would
shelter A’s future income and thus increase the after-tax return to
those investing in A. These tax attributes might distort the investors’
decisions towards choosing A.
Section 382 aims to prevent such distorted investment decisions.
The same severe limitations on tax attributes discussed in the previous
Section apply whenever a new shareholder acquires more than 50
percent of a corporation’s stock, even if the acquired stock is newly
issued.248 This requirement is a property rule, because if investors step
over the 50 percent ownership line, the severe penalty of permanently
limited tax attributes kicks in immediately, even if the acquisition is
only 51 percent.
During the 2008–09 financial crisis, the federal government took

247. See id. § 382(g)(1).
248. The precise measurement of an ownership change is more complex and is detailed in
§ 382(g) of the Internal Revenue Code. See generally BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 228, at ¶
14.43 (explaining this change-of-ownership trigger).
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ownership stakes of more than 50 percent in several corporations,
including the carmaker General Motors (GM), the insurer American
International Group (AIG), and the bank Citigroup.249 All three had
substantial tax attributes, and § 382’s plain statutory language would
have severely curtailed the use of their tax attributes. But the IRS
shifted to total nonenforcement of § 382 for acquisitions by the federal
government.250
This nonenforcement substantially increased the value of these
companies’ stock. For example, analysts’ research reports estimated
that the preservation of GM’s tax attributes increased GM stock’s
value by $12 billion.251 At first glance, this nonenforcement appears to
be a relatively innocuous accounting shift to improve the appearance
of the TARP bailout.252 The IRS gave up future tax revenue, garnering
249. See J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Can the Treasury Exempt Its Own
Companies from Tax? The $45 Billion GM NOL Carryforward, 1 CATO PAPERS ON PUB. POL’Y
1, 3–4 (2011) (describing the U.S. Treasury’s acquisition of shares in GM after GM declared
bankruptcy in June 2009).
250. I.R.S. Notice 2008-76, 2008-39 I.R.B. 768 (regarding federal government capital
injections into Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac); I.R.S. Notice 2008-84, 2008-41 I.R.B. 855
(regarding government as equity investor, issued right after the AIG bailout); I.R.S. Notice 2008100, 2008-44 I.R.B. 1081 (regarding government as equity investor via TARP), amplified by I.R.S.
Notice 2009-14, 2009-7 I.R.B. 516, amplified by I.R.S. Notice 2009-38, 2009-18 I.R.B. 901,
amplified by I.R.S. Notice 2010-2, 2010-2 I.R.B. 251 (specifically covering the government’s sale
of its GM stock into the public markets).
Congress ratified the IRS’s nonenforcement, solely with respect to the initial loan to GM
by TARP, by enacting I.R.C. § 382(n) (2012), with the American Recovery & Reinvestment Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1262(a), 123 Stat. 115, 343–44. But § 382(n)(2) expressly made subsection (n)
not applicable to TARP’s subsequent sale of GM stock to the public. As a result, the IRS had to
step in with Notice 2010-2, 2010-2 I.R.B. 251 § III.E. See generally Ramseyer & Rasmusen, supra
note 249, at 7–24 (explaining the IRS assistance in depth).
The IRS also moved to total nonenforcement of a related statutory provision, I.R.C.
§ 597(b)(3) (2006), which was implemented in Treas. Reg. §§ 1.597-2(a)(1), 1.597-1(b) (as
amended in 2017). That statute bars double tax benefits to banks, which could otherwise exclude
from gross income all government assistance that covered losses, while also deducting the losses.
The IRS simply moved to nonenforcement of this provision with respect to TARP government
assistance to banks. I.R.S. Notice 2008-101, 2008-44 I.R.B. 1082.
251. J.P. MORGAN CHASE & CO., GENERAL MOTORS: REBORN, HIGH OCTANE SAAR AND
PRODUCT PLAY; INITIATIVE WITH OVERWEIGHT 10 (Dec. 28, 2010) (“Via a special regulation,
GM’s highly valuable US tax assets . . . were left intact. . . . we arrive at a PV for global economic
tax assets ex[cluding] Europe of $12.4B at 2011-end.”); id. at 17 (explaining valuation
methodology and adding “We estimate GM will not be a US cash taxpayer until ~2017.”); id. at
85 tbl.31 (showing calculations); Ramseyer & Rasmusen, supra note 249, at 10 (discussing stock
analysts’ reports); Lubben, supra note 24 (describing the special tax treatment GM received);
Smith & Terlep, supra note 24 (describing the practical effects on GM’s business as a result of the
IRS notices).
252. Even tax practitioners who supported this IRS guidance admitted as much. See, e.g.,
Trivedi, supra note 24, at 1211 (quoting Todd B. Reinstein of Pepper Hamilton LLP as saying
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little public attention, and gave it back to the bailout recipients, letting
politicians and government officials crow about TARP’s relative
success.253 In effect, money went from the government’s “IRS pocket”
into the government’s “TARP pocket.”
But a huge chunk of money leaving the IRS pocket wound up in
other hands en route to the TARP pocket, because TARP owned only
part of the stock of these bailout recipients. For example, TARP held
only 61 percent of the shares of GM,254 so TARP only got 61 percent of
the $12 billion in benefits from the IRS’s nonenforcement of § 382,
which is approximately $7 billion.255 The remaining 39 percent of the
value from nonenforcement—approximately $5 billion—went to
shareholders other than the federal government.256
A proportional liability rule provides a better alternative to
nonenforcement of § 382 during government bailouts. This liability
rule could be an additional tax on any dividends flowing to shares that
were not issued to the federal government in exchange for the
bailout.257 This tax would apply until the value of the tax attributes is
recouped.258 This liability rule would compensate the federal
government for the tax benefits that flow to other shareholders, who
would no longer get a windfall.

“the notices were ‘a really great idea’ that worked to prop up the value of those companies,
making the government’s divestiture in them all the more profitable. ‘You’re enhancing the value
without putting the cash in’”).
253. Ramseyer & Rasmusen, supra note 249, at 5.
254. BILL CANIS & BAIRD WEBEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE ROLE OF TARP
ASSISTANCE IN THE RESTRUCTURING OF GENERAL MOTORS 10 (2014).
255. Ramseyer & Rasmusen, supra note 249, at 9 (observing that “$7.32 billion (= 0.61 x $12
billion) was a tax gift [from the Treasury] to itself”).
256. Id.; Lubben, supra note 24.
257. In effect, this would create two classes of stock, stock that the federal government had
owned and stock that it had not. The financial markets are well accustomed to trading and pricing
multiple classes of stock.
258. The value of the tax attributes, which would determine when the additional tax would
stop being charged, must already be calculated—and recalculated when applicable—by the
corporation for financial accounting purposes, as the tax attributes show up as “deferred tax
assets” on the balance sheet. See, e.g., Citigroup, Inc., 2017 Annual Report 175,
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/831001/000083100117000038/c-12312016x10k.htm
[https://perma.cc/LEV6-FQ8M]; Citigroup, Inc., Form 8-K, Jan. 16, 2018, Exhibit 99.1, at 1,
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/831001/000110465918002278/a18-3170_1ex99d1.htm
[https://perma.cc/KQ9A-WTUA]; Michael Rapoport, More Companies To Report Charges,
WALL STREET J., Jan. 17, 2018, at B2 (explaining why Citigroup, GM and other companies must
revalue their deferred tax assets).
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5. Mortgage-Backed Bonds. Mortgage-backed bonds played a
central role in the 2008–09 financial crisis. In response, the IRS moved
to partial nonenforcement of the tax rules governing mortgage-backed
bonds, providing incomplete relief that led to unnecessary home
foreclosures.
When a homebuyer takes out a mortgage, the mortgage is typically
pooled together with thousands of other mortgages, which are then
“securitized” into multiple bonds sold to investors.259 The majority of
all residential mortgages are securitized,260 and as of the end of 2008
there were $8.9 trillion in mortgage-backed bonds outstanding.261
Most mortgage-backed bonds are structured to qualify as Real
Estate Mortgage Investment Conduits (REMICs),262 which are
generally exempt from tax.263 In exchange for this favorable treatment,
Congress imposed stringent requirements that effectively limit a
259. See Anna Gelpern & Adam J. Levitin, Rewriting Frankenstein Contracts: Workout
Prohibitions in Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 1075, 1080–87 (2009);
Adam J. Levitin & Tara Twomey, Mortgage Servicing, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 11–22 (2011)
(providing excellent overview of mortgage securitization). Often the single pool of bonds issues
multiple “tranches” of bonds, with different priority claims to payment. Gelpern & Levitin, supra,
at 1084–85.
260. ANDREAS FUSTER & JAMES VICKERY, FED. RES. BANK OF NY, SECURITIZATION AND
THE FIXED-RATE MORTGAGE 45 fig.1.B (2014), https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/
media/research/staff_reports/sr594.pdf [https://perma.cc/7Z3Q-EG7X] (showing that over time in
excess of 80 percent of non-jumbo mortgages are either securitized by the GovernmentSponsored Enterprises (GSEs) or privately securitized); id. at 45 Fig. 1.A (showing that, except
during 1999-2000 and 2007-08, over 50 percent of jumbo mortgages are either securitized by the
GSEs or privately securitized); 2 INSIDE MORTG. FIN., 2007 MORTGAGE MARKET STATISTICAL
ANNUAL 3 (2007) (showing that in 2006 67.7 percent of the total dollar amount of mortgages were
securitized).
261. The Bond Market, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AGENCY, http://apps.finra.org/investor_
information/smart/bonds/401000.asp [https://perma.cc/ET83-2AVY].
262. Marshall D. Feiring, REMICs, Mortgage REITs, Mortgage Trusts and Other Real Estate
Mortgage Securitization Vehicles, U.S. Income Portfolios (BNA) No. 741-2d, § I.F (“REMICs are
. . . the predominant form for issuing mortgage-backed securities.”); Levitin & Twomey, supra
note 259, at 32 (noting “REMIC[s], [are] the typical form for PLS and some agency RMBS” and
that grantor trusts are used for certain agency RMBS); Ingrid Szura, Nice Try: Why Revenue
Procedure 2009-45 Will Not Curb the Rising Number of CMBS Loan Defaults, 37 MICH. REAL
PROP. REV. 85, 86 (2010) (noting that commercial mortgage-backed bonds are generally
REMICs). Some mortgage-backed bonds are issued not as REMICs but as grantor trusts, or
“mortgage trusts,” but this arrangement allows much less flexibility, such as allowing only one
class of debt without being subject to the punitive taxable mortgage pool (TMP) rules, I.R.C.
§ 7701(i) (2012), and much less tax certainty, see Feiring, supra, § III.E.3. The analysis in this
Section applies in full to mortgage trusts, which were dealt with in nearly identical terms by the
revenue procedures discussed below.
263. I.R.C. § 860A(a) (2012). The bondholders are, of course, still taxed on the interest they
receive. I.R.C. §§ 860A(b), 860B, 61(a)(4). Having no tax on the REMIC but tax on the
bondholders is the reason for the word “conduit” in “Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduit.”
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REMIC to holding a fixed pool of mortgages,264 and required that a
REMIC have “no powers to vary the composition of its mortgage
assets.”265 At least 99 percent of a REMIC’s assets must be mortgages
it acquires within its first three months of existence.266 For example, if
a REMIC starts up in January and then acquires a mortgage in May of
the same year, that mortgage does not count towards the stringent 99
percent requirement.
Losing REMIC qualification would be catastrophic,267 as all
income from the underlying assets would become subject to full
corporate taxation, permanently.268 Thus, the requirement that 99
percent of a REMIC’s assets be mortgages it acquires within its first
three months is protected by a property rule.
This property rule created severe problems when the housing
bubble burst. Many borrowers were unable or unwilling to pay their
mortgages. The natural solution was renegotiating the mortgages, with
some combination of forgiving principal, lowering interest rates, and
lengthening repayment times.269 Both the Bush and Obama
administrations had initiatives pushing such renegotiations.270
Renegotiation could be a win-win for both homeowners and mortgagebond investors, enabling homeowners to keep their homes and avoid
expensive, value-destroying foreclosure proceedings.
But renegotiation of a mortgage is generally treated, for tax
purposes, as if the original loan was replaced by a newly issued
264. I.R.C. § 860D(a)(4).
265. S. REP. NO. 99-313, at 791–92 (1986); I.R.C. § 860G(a)(3)(A) (limiting “qualified
mortgage” largely to mortgages either transferred to the REMIC on its formation or within its
first three months); see also Feiring, supra note 262, § IX.K.2 (noting that ever qualifying as a
“qualified replacement mortgage” is “unlikely”).
266. I.R.C. § 860G(a)(3)(A); Treas. Reg. § 1.860D-1(b)(3) (as amended in 1992); Feiring,
supra note 262, § IX.K.2 (observing that a REMIC may be able to qualify with less than 99 percent
of its assets being qualified, but a REMIC tests the 99 percent limit “at one’s peril”). Assets closely
related to the mortgages also count towards the 99 percent test. For example, a house received
upon foreclosure of a REMIC’s mortgage counts, as does cash required to properly service the
mortgage. I.R.C. § 860G(a)(5)–(8).
267. Levitin & Twomey, supra note 259, at 32–33 (“The economics of mortgage securitization
only work if the RMBS have pass-through tax status; an additional level of taxation would add
significant costs to securitization. Therefore, preservation of pass-through status is of paramount
importance to investors and the trust.”).
268. Failure to qualify as a REMIC would generally cause the pool to be taxed as a TMP.
I.R.C. § 7701(i); Feiring, supra note 262, §§ V.P, XI.A. There is a quite limited relief provision for
REMIC failures, I.R.C. § 860D(b)(2)(B); see Feiring, supra note 262, § V.P., but there is no
indication such as a private letter ruling that this relief provision has ever been applied.
269. See Gelpern & Levitin, supra note 259, at 1089.
270. BLINDER, supra note 134, at 327–38 (surveying the various initiatives).
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mortgage with the new terms.271 If a REMIC renegotiates more than 1
percent of its mortgages, it risks a catastrophic loss of tax
qualification.272 This is no unintended quirk of tax law. Renegotiating
mortgages is a normal business activity for banks, which are subject to
full corporate tax.273 In contrast, Congress expressly intended REMICs,
which are generally exempt from tax, to be mere passive investment
vehicles.274 Congress did not want REMICs to engage in bank-like
business activity.275 This worry was reasonable, as clever lawyers have
long tried to shoehorn bank-like activities into REMICs to avoid
corporate tax.276
During the financial crisis, the IRS correctly recognized the
serious problem caused by the property rule about REMICs modifying
mortgages. But the IRS moved from the property rule to
nonenforcement, which had three serious failings. First,
nonenforcement gave windfalls to REMICs that were able to profit
from renegotiating qualifying mortgages. Because REMICs are tax
free, these profits escaped taxation. Commentators and IRS officials
voiced concern that nonenforcement was letting REMICs engage in
many bank-like activities, tax free.277
Second, and most importantly, the IRS’s fear of giving windfalls
caused the IRS to keep its nonenforcement way too narrow. Rather
than moving to nonenforcement for all troubled mortgages, the IRS
allowed modification for only a crazy patchwork of mortgages. For
example, REMICs could freely renegotiate adjustable-rate mortgages

271. Treas. Reg. § 1.860G-2(b)(1)–(2) (as amended in 2013); id. § 1.1001-3(a), (e) (as amended
in 2013). De minimis renegotiations are generally not, however, treated as an exchange. Id. §
1.1001-3(e).
272. A narrow exception is available if the renegotiation was “occasioned by default or a
reasonably foreseeable default.” Treas. Reg. § 1.860G-2(b)(3)(i) (as amended in 2013). But this
exception provided little help. Millions of borrowers would likely default unless their mortgage
were renegotiated, but their default could not qualify as “reasonably foreseeable.” Rev. Proc.
2008-28, 2008-1 C.B. 1054 §§ 3.07, 5.04; Ctr. for Responsible Lending, Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr.
& Nat’l Ass’n of Consumer Advocates, Comments on Rev. Proc. 2008-28, TAX NOTES TODAY,
July 15, 2008, at 149–17.
273. Feiring, supra note 262, § VI.B.1.
274. See supra notes 264–65 and accompanying text.
275. Feiring, supra note 262, § VI.B.1.
276. Id. at ch. X (practice guides explaining how to subvert the existing REMIC rules to
qualify corporations engaging in banking-type activities for REMICs’ tax-free treatment).
277. Lee A. Sheppard, Tax Administrator Also Copes with Credit Meltdown, 120 TAX NOTES
1132, 1134 (2008) (“The IRS has not made a technical statement about whether forming a
workout factory would qualify for REMIC status . . . . A REMIC is supposed to be a static pool
of mortgages, while a workout factory might look more like a business.”).
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taken out between January 1, 2005, and July 31, 2007.278 This relief was
not available for standard fixed-rate mortgages, or for mortgages taken
out before 2005. As another example, REMICs could freely
renegotiate mortgages modified through a specific governmentsponsored modification program,279 but that program helped many
fewer mortgages than expected.280 The most generalized
nonenforcement that the IRS provided was allowing REMICs to freely
renegotiate a mortgage with a “significant risk of foreclosure” if
modifying that mortgage “substantially reduced [the] risk of
foreclosure.”281 This vaguely worded relief was hemmed in by severe
restrictions.282 In short, the IRS provided vastly underinclusive relief,
which drew criticism from bankers and consumer advocates alike.283
Third, even if a mortgage arguably qualified for the IRS’s
nonenforcement, a REMIC would often still hesitate to renegotiate it,
because the devastating property-rule remedy still lurked in the
background. Consider the IRS nonenforcement that allowed
renegotiating mortgages with a “significant risk of foreclosure”284 that
was “substantially reduced”285 by the renegotiation. These vague
standards inherently involve judgments about probabilities and
counterfactual situations. For example, a “significant” risk of
foreclosure might mean a 5 percent risk, a 51 percent risk, a 75 percent
risk, or some other number. Similarly, a “substantial” risk reduction
might mean a 5 percent reduction, a 90 percent reduction, or some
278. Rev. Proc. 2008-47, 2008-31 I.R.B. 272 § 2.03, amplifying Rev. Proc. 2007-72, 2007-2 C.B.
1257.
279. Rev. Proc. 2009-23, 2009-17 I.R.B. 884 (dealing with Home Affordable Mortgage
Program (HAMP)); see also I.R.S. Notice 2009-36, 2009-17 I.R.B. 883 (providing guidance on the
tax treatment of government assistance being provided to REMICs by HAMP); Amy S. Elliott,
IRS Expands REMIC Penalty Relief to Latest Housing Program, 123 TAX NOTES 279, 279 (2009)
(noting several beneficial exceptions to protect REMICs from incurring an increased tax liability
as a result of participating in HAMP).
280. BLINDER, supra note 134, at 335–36 (lamenting HAMP falling far short of its goals).
281. Rev. Proc. 2008-28, 2008-1 C.B. 1054 §§ 5.04 & 5.06 (applying to residential mortgages
held by REMICs and mortgage trusts); Rev. Proc. 2009-45, 2009-40 I.R.B. 471 §§ 5.03, 5.04
(applying to commercial mortgages held by REMICs and mortgage trusts).
282. Rev. Proc. 2009-45, 2009-40 I.R.B. 471, § 5.02(1) (preventing modification of any
mortgages in a REMIC where over 10 percent of loans were in default or “reasonably
foreseeable” default as of three months after the REMIC’s formation); Rev. Proc. 2008-28, 20081 C.B. 1054 § 5.02(1) (imposing similar requirement).
283. See, e.g., Letter from Stephen A. O’Connor, Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, and Anne C.
Canfield, Consumer Mortg. Coal., to Internal Revenue Service, Regarding Internal Revenue
Service Rev. Proc. 2008-28 (July 15, 2008).
284. Rev. Proc. 2008-28, 2008-1 C.B. 1054 § 5.04.
285. Id. § 5.06.
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other number. This uncertainty left tax practitioners fretting, with one
commenting that “it is hoped that the IRS would not second-guess the
business judgment of a servicer or lender where the judgment of the
servicer or lender is based on practical experience.”286 If the IRS did
second-guess a REMIC, the result would be the devastating property
rule. Many REMICs preferred not to run this risk and did not
renegotiate troubled mortgages, letting them go to foreclosure instead.
Instead of nonenforcement, the IRS could have moved
temporarily to a liability rule that allowed all mortgage modifications,
without limit, and imposed corporate taxes on any gains the REMIC
achieved from the modifications.287 This liability rule would be easy to
implement because it taxes the REMIC just like a normal corporation
on its mortgage modifications.
This liability rule would solve all three problems that arose from
nonenforcement. First, no REMICs would have windfalls, since gains
from modifications would be taxed at corporate rates, fully
compensating the government for any erosion of the corporate tax
base. If any REMIC engaged in the bank-like business of renegotiation
for profit, the profits would be taxed at corporate rates just like banks.
Second, all troubled mortgages could be renegotiated, not just those
falling into the IRS’s underinclusive patchwork. The IRS could
countenance such broad availability, as the liability rule prevents
windfalls. Third, REMICs would no longer be scared away from
modification by the combination of imprecise legal standards like
“significant risk of foreclosure”288 and the devastating property rule
that would apply if the IRS second-guessed the application of these
standards.289
286. Feiring, supra note 262, § IX.K.4; see also Elliott, supra note 279, at 279 (quoting Richard
Rydstrom, chair of the Coalition for Mortgage Industry Solutions, about the ambiguity of some
of the standards in the guidance); cf. Steven Seidenberg, The Pain Spreads: It’s the Commercial
Real Estate Market’s Turn To Take a Hit from the Financial Crisis, 96 A.B.A. J. 53, 56 (2010)
(“Servicers, however, may be leery of relying on this guidance. . . . [A] servicer may not want to
risk a REMIC’s tax status on the hope that a modification satisfies the somewhat vague criteria
of the IRS revenue procedure.”).
287. The gain from a mortgage modification would be computed under standard tax principles
as the fair market value of the modified mortgage, minus the REMIC’s adjusted basis in the
mortgage. I.R.C. § 1001 (2012); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.860F-2(c) (as amended in 1993) (REMIC’s
basis in mortgage is generally fair market value upon acquisition). This liability-rule approach of
applying the top corporate tax rate to earnings that should not normally be earned by a REMIC
has precedent. Any property income that a REMIC receives, including income from foreclosing
on mortgages, is taxed at full corporate tax rates. I.R.C. §§ 860G(a)(8), (c).
288. See supra note 284 and accompanying text.
289. Even if a liability rule does involve some ambiguity, it creates little risk since the
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Tax law was not the sole impediment to REMICs modifying
troubled mortgages.290 REMIC governing documents often make
modifications difficult.291 But these documents do so precisely because
their drafters feared losing REMIC tax status.292 A survey of these
documents found a majority had language directly tracking the tax law
language about REMICs modifying mortgages.293
consequences of overlooking or misjudging the ambiguity is only a compensatory additional
amount of tax. See Blair-Stanek, supra note 9, at 1199–1200.
290. Professor Adam Levitin and consumer law attorney Tara Twomey have identified other
nontax roadblocks preventing REMICs that primarily hold mortgages on residences, as opposed
to mortgages on commercial properties, from modifying troubled mortgages. See Levitin &
Twomey, supra note 259, at 69–84. First, residential mortgage REMIC governance structures do
not properly align the incentives of the servicers who run the REMICs with the interests of the
REMIC bond holders. Id. at 69–80. For example, servicers can often make more money through
activities like foreclosure that may not maximize recovery from bond holders. Second, bond
holders with different priority claims on the mortgage pool will often have competing interests.
Id. at 82. Levitin and Twomey propose REMICs holding residential mortgages fix these problems
by adopting the governance structures commonly used by REMICs holding commercial
mortgages, such as mortgages on office buildings and shopping malls. Id. at 85–90. These
proposals have great merit.
But the superiority of commercial-mortgage REMIC governance demonstrates how the
IRS’s response to the crisis was a key roadblock to all mortgage modification. Both residential
and commercial mortgages in REMICs faced distress as a result of the financial crisis. The IRS
extended nonenforcement of mortgage-modification prohibitions to a patchwork of both
residential and commercial mortgages. See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 2009-45, 2009-40 I.R.B. 471–73; cf.
T.D. 9463, 2009-40 I.R.B. 442 (Sept. 15, 2009) (permanent regulations providing modest
additional commercial-mortgage REMIC relief).
Yet the same three problems with the IRS’s nonenforcement of residential-mortgage
modification rules applied with full force to commercial-mortgage modification. It created
windfalls for lucky REMICs. It was underinclusive. See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 2009-45, 2009-40 I.R.B.
471 § 5.02 (barring relief if more than 10 percent of the commercial loans had had problems within
the three months after the REMIC was formed); id. § 5.01 (barring relief for commercial
mortgages on apartment buildings with three or four units). And it involved ambiguous standards
that left REMICs exposed to the devastating property rule remedy if they were misinterpreted.
See New REMIC Rules on Modifications, MORTGAGE BANKING, Oct. 2009, at 124 (quoting Jan
Sternin, senior vice president of commercial/multifamily at the Mortgage Bankers Association, as
saying, “[i]t will take some time for the servicers to determine how much latitude they have to
implement the new IRS rules”); Seidenberg, supra note 286, at 56 (“Servicers, however, may be
leery of relying on this guidance . . . . [A] servicer may not want to risk a REMIC’s tax status on
the hope that a modification satisfies the somewhat vague criteria of the IRS revenue
procedure.”).
291. These documents are often called Pooling and Servicing Agreements (PSAs). See
generally Gelpern & Levitin, supra note 259 (discussing these contracts).
292. Seidenberg, supra note 286, at 56 (“[M]any pooling and service agreements were drafted
with language that tracks the old IRS stance on modifications, thus prohibiting servicers from
making modifications.”).
293. Specifically, a majority allowed modification only upon default or “reasonably
foreseeable” default. John P. Hunt, What Do Subprime Securitization Contracts Actually Say
About Loan Modification?, 31 YALE J. REG. ONLINE 11, 15 (2013). This is the precise language
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Effectively, the normal tax rules against a REMIC modifying its
mortgages are baked into the governing documents of REMICs.294
Baking tax requirements protected by property rules into governing
documents generally makes sense, because failing such requirements
generally has draconian consequences. But one undesirable result is
that the whole system loses flexibility in times of crisis. Even though
the IRS moved to nonenforcement of these property-rule
requirements for some mortgages, many REMIC governing
documents prevented taking advantage of the IRS’s action.295
This unfortunate situation suggests a surprising benefit from
arranging, before the next financial crisis, liability rules to temporarily
replace property rules during crises. Prearranging moves to liability
rules empowers drafters of private legal documents to make it possible
to take advantage of the liability rules. For example, if tax
policymakers announce that during future financial crises, the property
rule restricting REMIC mortgage modifications will temporarily be
replaced by the liability rule, then the drafters of REMIC governing
documents can add provisions allowing REMICs to actually use the
liability rules during the next crisis. In this way, preannouncing
removes private contractual obstacles to responding to crises.
III. LESSONS FOR TAX LAW AND THE LITERATURE ON PROPERTY
RULES AND LIABILITY RULES
The previous Part examined the IRS’s ad hoc responses to the
2008–09 financial crisis, all of which involved abandoning property
rules that would have worsened the crisis. The bad responses shifted to
nonenforcement, whereas the good responses shifted temporarily to
liability rules, embodying the time-tested wisdom of both Ploof and
Vincent.
This Part distills and organizes nine specific lessons from the
previous Part’s discussion. It starts by detailing the benefits of moving

in the narrow exception allowing mortgage modification discussed supra note 272, including
Treas. Reg. § 1.860G-2(b)(3)(i) (as amended in 2013) (excepting “[c]hanges in the terms of the
obligation occasioned by default or a reasonably foreseeable default”).
294. These governing documents are, in turn, themselves very difficult to modify. See Gelpern
& Levitin, supra note 259, at 1087–1102.
295. See Szura, supra note 262, at 86 (“[T]he special servicer’s duties and obligations are
defined by the existing PSA, which very likely does not reflect the flexibility of Rev. Proc. 200945 with respect to modifications and workouts. . . . Therefore, unless the existing PSAs are
modified . . . special servicers are tied to the old PSA restrictions regarding modifications . . . .”);
accord Seidenberg, supra note 286, at 56.
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to liability rules,296 and then discusses the considerable additional
benefits of arranging these moves before the next crisis.297 Throughout,
this Part demonstrates how these lessons can be used in various other
areas of law to better respond to future financial crises, quickspreading epidemics, and bioterrorism. The Part concludes by
considering objections to prearranging temporary moves to liability
rules.298
A. Benefits of Moving to Liability Rules in Any Crisis
Even if policymakers have not already prepared moves from
property rules to liability rules before a crisis comes, it still makes sense
to move to liability rules. This Section discusses the benefits.
1. Preventing Windfalls and Unnecessary Violations. Liability
rules provide compensation for violations, which prevents windfalls
and creates incentives to avoid unnecessary violations. For example,
the doctrine of necessity requires that boaters compensate dock
owners, preventing windfalls to boaters and discouraging boaters from
unnecessarily staying docked during a storm.299 Similarly, the liability
rule that the IRS arranged for mutual funds’ 90 percent distribution
requirement compensated the government for violations, keeping
mutual funds from getting tax windfalls, and removed the incentive for
unnecessary violations.300
By contrast, the IRS’s bad responses, shifting to nonenforcement,
created substantial windfalls. The IRS gave “tax gift[s]”301 to Wells
Fargo and to GM. REMICs lucky enough to hold mortgages that the
IRS permitted to be modified could profit from the modifications, yet
pay zero tax on these profits. And not enforcing the property rule
against loans from foreign subsidiaries gave a windfall to U.S.
corporations that were not cash starved, but which nonetheless took
tax-free 179-day loans from their foreign subsidiaries. None of these
tax windfalls would have occurred had the IRS shifted temporarily to
liability rules instead of to nonenforcement.
This lesson applies in other areas of law. Consider constitutional

296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.

See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part III.B.
See infra Part III.C.
See supra notes 96–102 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.A.1.C.
Ramseyer & Rasmusen, supra note 249, at 9.

BLAIR-STANEK IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1204

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

2/28/2018 10:42 PM

[Vol. 67:1155

law’s current approach to quarantines—a move from property-rule
protection for liberty interests to nonenforcement for a quarantined
individual’s liberty. The predictable result is unnecessary quarantines;
for example, in 2014 an American nurse returned to the United States
from treating Ebola patients in Africa and was quarantined for several
days, despite her Ebola-negative blood test results.302 If constitutional
law adopted liability-rule protection for quarantined individuals, and
required compensation, then governments would have a monetary
incentive to avoid unnecessary quarantines where the costs imposed on
the individual clearly exceed benefits to society.
2. Making Broad, Clear Relaxation Palatable. The windfalls and
unnecessary violations created by moving to nonenforcement create
pressure to keep nonenforcement remedies narrow and vaguely
defined. But narrow or vaguely defined relief hampers crisis responses.
Consider the IRS’s half-hearted shifts to nonenforcement of
§ 956’s property rule against U.S. corporations borrowing cash from
their foreign subsidiaries.303 Properly designed temporary relief from
§ 956 could have been an excellent solution to the cash shortage at the
core of both the financial crisis and its spillover into the real economy.
But the IRS feared giving windfalls that were too large, so its responses
were too narrow304 and fraught with legal uncertainty.305 Similarly, the
IRS’s move to nonenforcement for the property rule against REMICs
modifying mortgages similarly resulted in relief that was too narrow306
and plagued with uncertainty,307 all because the IRS reasonably feared
that REMICs would reap tax-free windfalls on profits from modifying

302. See Hickox v. Christie, 205 F. Supp.3d 579, 585–88, 605 (D.N.J. Sept. 2, 2016) (relating
facts around nurse Kaci Hickox’s involuntary quarantine and rejecting Hickox’s claims for
monetary damages due to the New Jersey defendants’ qualified immunity).
303. See supra Parts II.B.1, 2.
304. Narrowness manifested itself in the IRS allowing all U.S. corporations to borrow
unlimited cash from foreign subsidiaries, but limiting this to only 179 days per year. See supra note
202. This narrow relief was insufficient for many businesses, which conserved cash by slashing
investment and laying off employees. See supra notes 205, 211, 212 and accompanying text.
305. Uncertainty resulted from the IRS allowing securities dealers to borrow using securities
that were not “readily marketable” as collateral, see supra note 216, but retaining the requirement
that the loan amount not exceed the securities’ fair market value, which was impossible to
determine because no market existed. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
306. See supra note 278.
307. For a discussion of vagueness in terms such as “significant risk of foreclosure,” see supra
note 281–282 and accompanying text. For practitioner concerns over these vague terms, see supra
note 286.
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mortgages.308 But the IRS could have provided clear, broad relief
without the possibility of windfalls by moving instead to a
compensatory liability rule.
This lesson applies to other areas of law. Constitutional law
currently views liberty interests as protectable only by property-rule
remedies, although in crises like epidemics, courts typically move
clumsily to nonenforcement.309 As a result, the law governing
quarantines and other measures to handle crises is uncertain.310 If
constitutional law allowed temporary liability rules during crises, the
law could become clearer and more certain.
3. Minimizing Contagion. Tort law’s temporary move from
property rules to liability rules during storms minimizes total damage
to two parties, boaters and dock owners. By contrast, similar temporary
moves to liability rules in other areas of law can have much broader
benefits, preventing contagion that harms third parties.
For example, the IRS’s response for mutual funds311 prevented fire
sales of assets that would have harmed third parties holding such assets
and that would have deepened the crisis and economic harm.312 The
IRS’s mutual fund response also likely prevented cascading
insolvencies of financial institutions.313
As another example, bankruptcy law moving to temporary
liability rules for repos would prevent contagion through fire sales
caused by creditors seizing and selling the securities used as collateral
in repos by troubled debtors like Lehman Brothers.314 Similarly, patent
law’s move to temporary liability rules for epidemic-fighting drug
patents makes it easier for all manufacturers to rush generic versions
to stop a disease’s contagion from person to person.
B. Benefits of Prearranging These Moves Before the Next Crisis
The previous Section detailed the benefits of moving temporarily
from property rules to liability rules during crises. Those benefits come
308. Feiring, supra note 262, § X (guide to potential abuses).
309. Kontorovich, supra note 37, at 780–86.
310. Id. at 803–05.
311. See supra Part II.A.1.
312. See supra notes 156–59 and accompanying text.
313. See supra notes 160–61 and accompanying text.
314. See Morrison et al, supra note 117, at 1030–31. Note that Morrison, Roe, and Sontchi do
not argue for pliability rules, but argue—without using the term—for permanently moving to
liability rules.
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even when the liability rules are created on the fly to respond to the
crisis. This Section details benefits, previously unrecognized in the
literature, that policymakers can achieve through pliability rules, by
announcing both the liability rule and the trigger for temporarily
moving to it in advance of any crisis.
1. Speed. Triggering liability rules quickly minimizes the harm
from crises; when a boat is caught in a storm, the sooner the boat is
allowed to use a dock, the less likely the boat is to shipwreck. Speed is
similarly essential in responding to financial crises,315 where the loss of
confidence in a financial institution can cause its failure literally
overnight.316 But the IRS moves slowly in issuing new guidance.317 For
example, the guidance318 shifting the 90 percent distribution
requirement for mutual funds came in January 2009, several months
into the financial crisis.319 The only way to ensure a speedy IRS
response is to prepare for the switch to a liability rule in advance.
This lesson applies to many other areas of law. Consider patent
law. Society can best respond to a quick-spreading epidemic if a
preexisting framework exists to permit all manufacturers to make
patented drugs that would fight the epidemic, with compensation to
patent holders. Such a framework does not currently exist. The U.S.
government’s response to the 2001 anthrax scare provides a warning.
The antibiotic ciprofloxacin (Cipro) was considered by experts to be
the best drug to treat anthrax, and Bayer AG held the patent.320 Bayer
lacked capacity to provide Cipro for the entire U.S. population and
refused to voluntarily license other manufacturers to meet the needs of
the United States.321 Prearranging procedures for speedy shifts to
315. See PAULSON, supra note 28, at 244 (recalling that, in order to stem the crisis, “our actions
had to be decisive and overwhelming”).
316. See id. at 362 (noting that, in contrast to industrial companies, “[a] financial institution
could go under immediately if it lost the confidence of creditors and clients”); ROUBINI & MIHM,
supra note 25, at 112–13.
317. Sheppard, supra note 203, at 128 (observing that “we take paralysis in tax administration
for granted”).
318. Rev. Proc. 2009-15, 2009-4 I.R.B. 356; see Part II.A.1.
319. In comparison, Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy on September 15, 2008.
320. Resnik & De Ville, supra note 127, at 29–30; see also T. Inglesby et al., Anthrax as a
Biological Weapon, 281 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1735, 1740–41 (1999) (reviewing evidence that shows
Cipro is the best treatment for those exposed to anthrax).
321. Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jerry Avorn, Biomedical Patents and the Public’s Health: Is There
a Role for Eminent Domain?, 25 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 434, 434 (2006); Lody Petersen & Robert
Pear, Anthrax Fears Send Demand for Drug Far Beyond Output, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2001, at
A1.
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liability rules for patents that can fight epidemics or bioterrorism are
clearly in society’s best interests.
Bankruptcy law could also best respond to a financial crisis by
having speedy prearranged shifts to liability rules for repo contracts.
Repo creditors have a property-rule right to seize the securities used as
collateral,322 which incentivizes seizing collateral at the first sign that
the debtor is having trouble.323 Lehman Brothers is a case in point.
Lehman borrowed heavily using repo contracts, and the moment repo
creditors lost confidence, it failed.324 Lehman’s failure was effectively a
bank run as repo creditors exercised their property-rule rights to seize
the collateral.325 Stemming this outflow quickly is essential to stopping
the bank run, and a speedy prearranged shift to liability rules facilitates
this stop.
2. Avoiding Moral Hazard. This benefit is counterintuitive. This
Article earlier explained why the doctrine of necessity does not create
moral hazard for boaters,326 and why temporary shifts to liability rules
in tax law do not create moral hazard for taxpayers.327 But
preannouncing the shifts to liability rules can even reduce moral hazard
if parties already assume that property rules will be moved to
nonenforcement in a crisis.
For example, the IRS’s moves to nonenforcement during the
2008–09 financial crisis gave windfalls to a number of taxpayers, like
Wells Fargo.328 Taxpayers probably expect that the IRS will make
similar moves to nonenforcement in the next crisis. Recall that moral
hazard exists in “any situation in which one person makes the decision
about how much risk to take, while someone else bears the cost if things
go badly.”329 Taxpayers expecting to benefit from nonenforcement will
make decisions about how much risk to take prior to crises and expect
the government to bear the cost through nonenforcement when things
go badly and the crisis arrives. The current state of affairs thus creates

322. See supra note 119.
323. See supra notes 121–22.
324. 1 Report of Anton R. Valukas, Bankruptcy Examiner at 3, In re Lehman Brothers
Holdings Inc., No. 08-13555 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2010).
325. Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo, 104 J. FIN.
ECON. 425, 425, 433 (2012).
326. See supra notes 99–103 and accompanying text.
327. See supra Part II.A.1.
328. See supra Part II.B.
329. KRUGMAN, supra note 99, at 63.
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moral hazard. Tax law can eliminate this moral hazard simply by
prearranging the shifts to liability rules for future crises, thereby
disabusing taxpayers from expecting nonenforcement.
Constitutional law offers a similar lesson. Courts move to
nonenforcement of liberty entitlements for individuals quarantined
during epidemics.330 Lawmakers routinely make decisions on scientific
research and mosquito control that impact the risk of an epidemic, and
likely spend suboptimal amounts of money.331 This underspending can
be explained, in part, by lawmaker knowledge that if an epidemic
starts, the government need not compensate quarantined individuals.
Constitutional law’s nonenforcement of individual liberty during
epidemics thus creates moral hazard, because lawmakers decide how
much risk to take, while the quarantined individuals will bear much of
the cost if things go badly and an epidemic emerges. But if epidemics
caused liability-rule protection for quarantined individuals, requiring
government compensation, then this moral hazard would disappear.
3. Transparency in Liability-Rule Compensation. Scholars have
long recognized that liability rules may be seriously
undercompensatory or overcompensatory, thus skewing incentives and
inviting opportunistic behavior.332 Liability rules created on the fly in
response to a crisis are much more likely to undercompensate or
overcompensate. Moreover, in the heat of a crisis, public attention
tends to focus on splashier issues than the design of liability rules,333
making midcrisis correction unlikely. The best way to design liability
rules that get incentives right is to announce in advance how they will
be calculated, and to subject them to public scrutiny and revision.
4. Encouraging Flexible Legal Arrangements.
Prearranged
pliability rules provide legal certainty.334 Knowing the circumstances

330. See supra note 115.
331. See, e.g., Emmarie Huetteman, Five Things To Know About Congress’s Fight over Zika,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/07/us/politics/five-things-to-knowabout-congresss-fight-over-zika.html
[https://perma.cc/MAZ6-8C82];
Kristina
Peterson,
Congress Releases Funding To Aid Fight Against Ebola: Ends Delay by Lawmakers Seeking More
Information on Administration’s Strategy, WALL STREET J. (Oct. 10, 2014), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/congress-releases-funding-to-aid-fight-against-ebola-1412959345 [https://perma.cc/VYW
5-U4UZ].
332. See, e.g., AYRES, supra note 61, at 199; Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 37, at 730–32; Henry
E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 1743 (2004).
333. See Ramseyer & Rasmusen, supra note 249, at 5.
334. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 10, at 27 (observing that pliability rules provide
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that trigger switching temporarily to a liability rule and knowing the
content of that liability rule enable parties to plan ahead, including
designing their contracts and other legal arrangements to respond most
efficiently.335
Recall the problem seen with REMIC governing documents,
which were drafted before the 2008–09 crisis under the assumption that
the property rule against mortgage modifications would always apply
in full.336 During the crisis, the IRS shifted to nonenforcement for some
mortgage modifications, but their governing documents barred
REMICs from taking advantage of even this limited
nonenforcement.337 This inflexibility baked into the documents
doubtless encouraged more home foreclosures.338
Prearranging pliability rules for crises would prevent such
problems. A REMIC’s governing document could arrange for the
REMIC to take advantage of the liability rule. The document could
also handle important questions such as who decides which mortgages
to modify, using what criteria, and how any gains or losses from the
modifications would be allocated between different bondholders in the
REMIC.339
Prearranging pliability rules would allow private contracts to
adapt across many areas of law. In patent law, pliability rules for
patented drugs that fight epidemics would enable manufacturers to
have supply contracts in place to rush drugs to stem the epidemic. If
constitutional law adopted a pliability rule providing compensation for
quarantined individuals during epidemics, then union-bargained
contracts of employees most likely to be quarantined, such as
healthcare workers and airline employees, could provide for matters
such as allocating the compensation.340 If bankruptcy law had a

“certainty concerning future changes in the rules protecting their entitlements, and, therefore, a
truer appreciation of the nature of protection they enjoy at present”).
335. Id.; id. at 78–79 (observing the substantial benefits of the “post-petition rules of
bankruptcy [which] are relatively clear and can be planned for”); id. at 57 (noting that adverse
possession, which is a type of pliability rule, “facilitate[s] trade and reduce[s] conflicts”).
336. See supra notes 292, 293.
337. See supra notes 292, 293, 295 and accompanying text.
338. See supra note 283.
339. See Levitin & Twomey, supra note 259, at 85–90 (discussing how governing documents
for REMICs holding commercial mortgages, unlike governing documents for REMICs holding
residential mortgages, handle many such matters). For a collection of sources about how even
commercial-mortgage REMICs had problems taking advantage of the IRS’s nonenforcement
because their governing documents baked in the property rules, see supra note 290.
340. Recall that the SARS outbreak caused serious financial losses for airlines. Painful Side-
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pliability rule for repo borrowing, that would likely result in the
industry-standardized repo contracts341 accommodating temporary
moves to a liability rule.
5. Discretionary Versus Automatic Triggers. A pliability rule
moves from a property rule to a liability rule when a trigger is met.342
Triggers can be designed in advance to maximize effectiveness and to
minimize the potential for abuse. Most importantly, triggers can be
either discretionary or automatic. A discretionary trigger gives one or
more officials the power to decide when the property rule moves to a
liability rule. An automatic trigger moves to a liability rule when some
objective criterion is met.
An automatic trigger responding to a financial crisis might involve
market-related data reaching thresholds that have indicated financial
crises in the past. For example, the trigger could be the average interest
rate paid on moderate-risk corporate bonds exceeding the interest rate
on ten-year U.S. Treasury bonds by more than 5.0 percent.343 Another
trigger might involve the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank’s widely
followed Financial Stress Index, which is based on statistical
relationships between several market indicators.344 A crisis could be
triggered automatically when this Financial Stress Index exceeds a high
numerical threshold.345 Similarly, an automatic trigger responding to a
quick-spreading epidemic might come into play when a prespecified
number of people in the United States are diagnosed with the disease.
Effects, ECONOMIST (May 5, 2003), http://www.economist.com/node/1747241 [https://perma.cc/
8PL9-2W2J].
341. SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MKTS. ASS’N & INT’L CAPITAL MKT. ASS’N, GLOBAL MASTER
REPURCHASE AGREEMENT ¶ 2(a), 10 (2011), https://www.sifma.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/
08/Global-Master-Repurchase-Agreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/6J4K-SKX3].
342. To use Bell and Parchomovsky’s terminology, pliability rules that move from a generally
applicable property rule to a liability rule are “classic” pliability rules. Bell & Parchomovsky,
supra note 10, at 31. This Article uses a slight variation, defining “classic” pliability rules as those
where the switch to a liability rule is temporary.
343. See BofA Merrill Lynch US Corporate BBB Option-Adjusted Spread, FED. RES. BANK
ST. LOUIS, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLC0A4CBBB [https://perma.cc/CQF2-YTG2].
The New York State Bar Association has proposed that the IRS use precisely such an automatic
trigger before it applies its explicit statutory authority to suspend certain deduction-denying and
-delaying provisions. See AHYDO Report, supra note 129, at 9–10 (noting that “[i]n the last
approximately twenty years, this condition would have been present only between September
2008 and May 2009”).
344. St. Louis Fed Financial Stress Index, FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS, https://fred.stlouisfed.
org/series/STLFSI [https://perma.cc/J763-XJSF].
345. For example, the threshold could be 1.0. By comparison, the index reached 5.455 on
October 17, 2008, at the height of the financial crisis. Id.
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A discretionary trigger would involve an official or body deciding
when a crisis exists, based on some standard.346 The discretion for
declaring a financial crisis might be given to the Treasury secretary,
whose department includes not only the IRS, but also a number of
other agencies that keep it highly attuned to the entire financial
system.347 Indeed, Congress has given discretion to the Treasury
secretary in several analogous situations.348 For epidemics, a
discretionary trigger might be given to health officials such as the
surgeon general.349
Automatic triggers and discretionary triggers each have their
respective strengths and weaknesses. Discretionary triggers can be
abused if the official unwisely triggers them (or refuses to trigger them)
to serve ulterior motives.350 For example, the Treasury secretary may
346. This discretionary approach is taken in the doctrine of necessity, where the relevant
official is a judge, who decides whether a necessity existed using a specific standard. See generally
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 197 cmts. a–k (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (establishing various
standards to determine whether the doctrine of necessity applies). The body making the decision
could also be as broad as the entire electorate voting in a referendum. E.g., Rachel D. Godsil,
Viewing the Cathedral from Behind the Color Line: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Environmental Racism, 53 EMORY L.J. 1807, 1875–78 (2004).
347. See, e.g., PAULSON, supra note 28, at 49.
348. Congress has permanently granted the Treasury secretary statutory power to suspend
certain tax rules disallowing certain bond interest deductions “if the Secretary determines that
such application is appropriate in light of distressed conditions in the debt capital markets.” I.R.C.
§ 163(e)(5)(F)(iii) (2012). This discretion has been exercised once. I.R.S. Notice 2010-11, 2010-4
I.R.B. 326; see also AHYDO Report, supra note 129, at 7 & 9 (providing background on this
exercise of discretion). Outside of tax law, the Treasury secretary has discretion to suspend certain
bank regulations upon determining that doing so would “avoid or mitigate” “serious adverse
effects on economic conditions or financial stability.” 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(G)(i)(I), (II) (2012).
The bank regulations that are thus waived involve the requirement that least-cost procedures be
used to resolve insolvent banks. Id. § 1823(c)(4)(A). Before exercising this discretion, the
secretary must consult with the president and get approval from both the Federal Reserve board
and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation board. Id. § 1823(c)(4)(G)(i). During the 2008–
09 financial crisis, the Treasury secretary exercised this discretion several times. The Treasury
secretary used this power to set up the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program (TLGP) and to
assist Citigroup. 2010 Annual Report: IV. Financial Statements and Notes, FDIC, https://www.fdic.
gov/about/strategic/report/2010annualreport/chpt4-01.html [https://perma.cc/W3VV-58KG].
349. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 264 (2012) (granting quarantine powers to “[t]he Surgeon General,
with the approval of the Secretary” of Health and Human Services); N.J. REV. STAT. § 26:4–2(d)–
(e) (2013) (granting quarantine powers to state and local health departments).
350. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 10, at 77 (“[T]he identity of the party exercising that
discretion naturally affects the incentive effects of the pliability rule.”); see, e.g., Hickox v.
Christie, 205 F. Supp. 3d 579, 584 (D.N.J. 2016) (governor who was also a candidate for president
arguably quarantined a nurse to further his presidential prospects); Letter from Ralph Nader and
James Love, Consumer Project on Tech., to DHHS Secretary Tommy Thompson (Oct. 18, 2001),
reprinted in CONSUMER PROJECT ON TECH., [hereinafter Letter to Tommy Thompson]
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/cl/cipro/nadethom10182001.html [https:// perma.cc/33GL-F7TL]
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have close connections to a financial institution that is the debtor in
many repo contracts and would thus benefit from triggering the
bankruptcy rules for repos to move to liability rules. Or the surgeon
general may have sympathies for generic drug manufacturers.
Automatic triggers avoid such abuse,351 but also put the pliability rule
on autopilot that may fail to be triggered. The relative advantages of
discretionary versus automatic triggers for pliability rules are an area
particularly ripe for further scholarship.
6. Establishing Proper Legal Authority. During a crisis, moving
from a property rule to a liability rule may be good policy, but may not
be possible if the relevant agency has no statutory authority to impose
a compensatory liability rule. The IRS achieved its four good crisis
responses—that is, temporary liability rules—discussed earlier352
through very creative interpretation of the applicable provisions.353 But
many crisis-worsening requirements may not be susceptible to such
creative interpretations. Planning ahead for the temporary moves to
liability rules ensures that the government can arrange proper legal
authority.
In tax law, the IRS can arguably arrange such moves in advance
by aggressively using closing agreements, which are written
agreements between the IRS and a taxpayer specifying some aspect of
the taxpayer’s tax treatment.354 The IRS could promulgate a closing
agreement that changes a particular property rule into a liability rule
and announce that, during a future crisis, it will automatically enter into
(accusing DHHS Secretary Thompson of not using 28 U.S.C. § 1498 discretion to compulsorily
license Cipro to fight anthrax for ideological reasons).
351. Richard Epstein, a leading proponent of property rules, notes that when law departs
from the norm of property rules to liability rules, it hems in their use with extensive institutional
safeguards to prevent mischief. Epstein, supra note 102, at 2111–20. This insight applies in full to
triggering mechanisms that move to liability rules.
352. See supra Part II.A.
353. With mutual funds and REITs, the IRS built upon preexisting legal theories explored
long before the crisis in handling particular taxpayer situations. See, e.g., IRS Priv. Ltr. Rul.
200615024 (Jan. 10, 2006) (applying I.R.C. § 305(b) (2000) to count paper dividends as real
dividends). For variable annuities and the guaranteed municipal bonds, the Treasury creatively
used a longstanding statutory provision to charge the compensatory guarantee fee. 31 U.S.C. §
5302 (2006); see CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, 111TH CONG., GUARANTEES AND CONTINGENT
PAYMENTS IN TARP AND RELATED PROGRAMS 24 (2009), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT
-111JPRT53348/pdf/CPRT-111JPRT53348.pdf [https://perma.cc/6EEE-AL3G]. This creative
legal interpretation was criticized on several grounds. Id. at 69–71.
354. I.R.C. § 7121 (2012) (grant of authority applicable to “any internal revenue tax for any
taxable period”); Treas. Reg. §301.7121-1(b)(2)–(3) (2017) (closing agreements may cover any
past, current, or future tax issue); SALTZMAN & BOOK, supra note 165, ¶ 9.09.
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that closing agreement with any taxpayer that requests it. Such use of
closing agreements has precedent. The IRS has already used closing
agreements to permanently turn several tax law requirements that the
IRC protects with property rules into being protected by de facto
liability rules.355 Congress is well aware of the IRS’s longstanding
aggressive use of closing agreements,356 which are, moreover,
effectively immune from judicial challenge.357 Nonetheless, the IRS
355. Municipal bonds and pensions plans are the two areas where the IRS has permanently
turned property-rule requirements into liability-rule requirements via the closing agreement
power. Many of the requirements for a municipal bond to be tax exempt are protected by the
property-rule remedy of losing tax exemption for the bond, which would be disastrous. BITTKER
& LOKKEN, supra note 138, ¶ 15.1 (analogizing losing tax exempt status to the death penalty);
Blair-Stanek, supra note 9, at 1183–84. Similarly, many of the requirements for a pension plan to
be tax free are protected by the harsh property-rule remedy of taxing both the plan trust itself
and the future retirees. Blair-Stanek, supra note 10, at 1184–85. But administrative guidance from
the IRS has permanently changed almost all these requirements to liability-rule protection
through closing-agreement programs. See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 2013-12, 2013-4 I.R.B. 313 (retirement
plan Audit Closing Agreement Program); Rev. Proc. 97-15 § 6, modified by Notice 2008-31, 20081 C.B. 592, modified by Notice 2001-60, 2001-2 C.B. 304. For example, if a pension plan violates
a requirement protected by a property rule, IRS guidance allows the plan to keep its tax
qualification by paying a compensatory amount proportional to the harm, calculated using a
number of factors. Rev. Proc. 2013-12 §§ 14.01, 5.01(5). Basically, this guidance moves the
statutory property-rule remedy to a liability rule. These moves are a well-settled part of the tax
landscape. See JAMES A. CONIGLIO, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEBT FINANCING ¶ 6:21
(2d ed. 2014); PAMELA D. PERDUE, QUALIFIED PENSION AND PROFIT-SHARING PLANS ¶ 19.02
(2014). IRS employees work from standardized processes and standardized forms. See, e.g., IRM
§ 7.11.8.2.3 (“Preparing the Draft Closing Agreement.”); IRM exhibit 7.2.1-1 (“Closing
Agreement on Final Determination Covering Specific Matters.”).
The same broad closing-agreement authority could arrange for crisis-worsening property
rules to temporarily become liability rules during financial crises. The IRS’s guidance would
provide a standardized closing agreement whereby the IRS agreed not to enforce the property
rule during the crisis, in consideration for the taxpayer agreeing to pay a liability-rule amount of
extra tax calculated according to the agreement. Cf. Rink v. Comm’r, 47 F.3d 168, 171 (6th Cir.
1995) (“A closing agreement is a contract, and generally is interpreted under ordinary contract
principles.”). Once the crisis was declared, all affected taxpayers could submit the standardized
agreement, to which the IRS would automatically agree.
356. Congressional reports favorably discuss the sources listed supra note 355 as part of
existing tax law. See, e.g., JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 113TH CONG., PRESENT LAW AND
BACKGROUND RELATING TO TAX-FAVORED RETIREMENT SAVINGS 28–29 (Comm. Print,
2014).
357. The taxpayers who submitted these agreements would be bound. I.R.C. § 7121(b)
(“[S]uch agreement shall be final and conclusive.”). Third parties, meanwhile, have no standing
to challenge the treatment of taxpayers who submitted the agreements. See Ariz. Christian Sch.
Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 135–36 (2011). And any attempt to challenge the IRS’s
administrative guidance itself would be barred by the Tax Anti-Injunction Act and the
Declaratory Judgment Act. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2012) (explicitly barring declaratory judgments on
most Federal tax law issues); I.R.C. § 7421(a) (explicitly barring “suit[s] for the purpose of
restraining the assessment or collection of any tax . . . in any court,” with limited exceptions); see
Kristin E. Hickman, A Problem of Remedy: Responding to Treasury’s (Lack of) Compliance with
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could guarantee proper legal authority by getting statutory
authorization from Congress for its temporary shifts to liability rules.
Patent law has a similar lack of legal authority in dealing with
epidemics and bioterrorism. During the 2001 anthrax attacks, the
nation lacked sufficient supplies of the patented antibiotic Cipro.358
The secretary of Health and Human Services claimed that he lacked
the legal authority to move to liability rule protection for the patent.359
Thankfully the anthrax attacks stopped, but the episode provides a
salutary warning on the importance of obtaining clear legal authority
to move to liability rules during crises.
C. Objections
The previous two Sections analyzed the benefits of moving from
property rules to liability rules during crises and of prearranging these
moves. This Section considers two potential objections.
1. Will Prearranged Moves Increases Crises’ Likelihood? This
Article has demonstrated how prearranged pliability rules can
minimize the harm caused by crises. This Article has also discussed
how pliability rules do not increase moral hazard, because liability rules
require compensation.360 Indeed, prearranging pliability rules can even
reduce moral hazard by keeping parties from expecting windfalls.361
But one can reasonably ask whether prearranging pliability rules can
increase the likelihood of crises due to shifts in ex ante incentives. This
possibility cannot be ruled out when dealing with complex social
systems and is a promising subject for future research by legal scholars
and economists.
Consider pliability rules in patent law that respond to quickspreading epidemics or bioterrorism. Prearranging moves to liability
Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1153, 1162–73
(2008).
358. Elisabeth Bumiller, A Nation Challenged: The Response; Administration Won’t Allow
Generic Versions of Drug, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/18/
us/nation-challenged-response-administration-won-t-allow-generic-versions-drug.html [https://
perma.cc/RL48-3E4W].
359. Id. (“Tommy G. Thompson, the health and human services secretary, said . . . that
violating the patent on Cipro, the drug most recommended for treatment of anthrax, was illegal.
But Mr. Thompson got an immediate argument from patent lawyers as well as from Senator
Charles E. Schumer.”); cf. Letter to Tommy Thompson, supra note 350 (arguing that 28 U.S.C. §
1498 provided sufficient legal authority).
360. See supra notes 99, 154 and accompanying text.
361. See supra Part III.B.2.
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rules for patented drugs would help fight the epidemic, but would also
prevent the patent holder from reaping large profits during the
epidemic. Taking away such possible profits might dampen incentives
for research and development into new drugs in the first place.362
A similar concern applies in tax law. Taking away one risk, that a
crisis may result in inadvertently failing a devastating property rule,
may make a taxpayer willing to take on more nontax risks.
Cumulatively, many taxpayers taking greater nontax risks may
increase the likelihood of a financial crisis.
Recall that the property rule of § 956 kept U.S. corporations from
borrowing cash from their foreign subsidiaries.363 Suppose that shifting
this property rule to a liability rule temporarily during crises had been
prearranged.364 This prearranged shift might have led U.S.
corporations to borrow more from short-term capital markets, secure
in the knowledge that if a crisis caused such financing to dry up, then
they still could borrow from their foreign subsidiaries—albeit with
compensation paid to the government. Such incentives would have led
to more business debt, and more business debt makes the economy
more prone to crises.365 But this prearranged shift would have had
countervailing effects that might have reduced the risk of financial
crises by preventing borrower bank runs. During the 2008–09 financial
crisis, many U.S. corporations with lines of credit at troubled banks
rushed to borrow as much as possible, just in case the troubled bank
failed, causing the line of credit to disappear.366 This borrowing rush
drained troubled banks of badly needed cash, furthering the financial
crisis.367 If U.S. corporations had known that, in a crisis, they could
362. Rexford E. Santerre & John A. Vernon, Assessing Consumer Gains from a Drug Price
Control Policy in the United States, 73 S. ECON. J. 233, 234 (2006).
363. See supra Part II.B.1. Section 956 was made largely irrelevant by the tax reform
legislation passed in late 2017. See supra notes 194–96.
364. See supra notes 206–07 and discussion in accompanying text.
365. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 101ST CONG., FEDERAL INCOME TAX ASPECTS OF
CORPORATE FINANCIAL STRUCTURES 63–70 (Comm. Print 1989); accord INT’L MONETARY
FUND, DEBT BIAS AND OTHER DISTORTIONS: CRISIS-RELATED ISSUES IN TAX POLICY 4 (2009),
https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2009/061209.pdf [https://perma.cc/7XWH-GH97] (“tax
distortions are likely to have contributed to the crisis by leading to levels of debt higher than
would otherwise have been the case”).
366. Judit Montoriol-Garriga & Evan Sekeris, A Question of Liquidity: The Great Banking
Run of 2008? 5–7 (Fed. Res. Bank of Bos., Working Paper QAU09-4, 2009),
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.369.2175&rep=rep1&type=pdf [https://
perma.cc/5VTE-NG8A].
367. Id. This line-of-credit bank run has led banking regulators to propose that banks
maintain more capital in reserve against lines of credit. See J.P. MORGAN, CORPORATE FINANCE
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borrow from their own foreign subsidiaries, such borrower bank runs
would have been less likely, reducing the risk of financial crisis.368 In
sum, prearranging this shift to a liability rule might increase or decrease
the likelihood of a future financial crisis; the net effect, if any, is
unclear.
As another example, consider the liability rule proposed above for
REMICs, letting them modify mortgages freely during crises, but
imposing corporate tax on any profits from the modifications.369 A
prearranged move to this rule would increase the likelihood that
troubled mortgages will be modified,370 which might increase
borrowers’ likelihood of taking out risky mortgages, which, in turn,
would increase the likelihood of financial crises. This risk is likely
small, since the mid-2000s housing bubble inflated despite propertyrule restrictions on REMICs modifying mortgages.371 Moreover, the
potential availability of mortgage modification would give REMIC
creators an incentive to screen out those mortgage borrowers most
likely to require modification. Such screening could reduce the risk of
future crises. Again, it is unclear whether this prearranged move would
increase or decrease the likelihood of a financial crisis. Modeling the
impact of such moves on risk is a particularly promising area for future
economic research.
2. Why Not Permanently Move to Liability Rules? One can
reasonably ask why not just change all potentially crisis-worsening
requirements to liability rules, permanently. For example, all patented
drugs that might fight epidemics or bioterrorism could be subject to

SPRIG OF BASEL: BASEL III IMPLICATIONS FOR NON-BANKS 2–3 (2014), https://
www.jpmorgan.com/cm/BlobServer/Corporate_Finance_with_a_Sprig_of_Basel:_Basel_III_Imp
lications_for_NonBanks.pdf?blobkey=id&blobwhere=1320693985173&blobheader=application/pdf&blobheadern
ame1=Cache-Control&blobheadervalue1=private&blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs
[https://perma.cc/YW94-KP7E].
368. SENATE PSI REPORT, supra note 199, exhibit 3b (citing an internal Hewlett-Packard Co.
presentation stating that “[t]he company has . . . lines of credit meant to be used if the [commercial
paper] market should become unavailable to HP. However, should the [commercial paper]
market disappear generally, the demand for draws on lines of credit would overwhelm the
banking system”).
369. See supra Part II.B.5.
370. For a discussion on how REMIC organizational documents could accommodate the
possible liability rule, see supra note 339 and accompanying text.
371. Research suggests that mortgage borrowers were unduly optimistic and did not even
consider the downside possibilities. Oren Bar-Gill, The Law, Economics, and Psychology of
Subprime Mortgage Contracts, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1073, 1120–21 (2009).
WITH A
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compulsory license, at all times. As another example, the mutual fund
90 percent distribution requirement could always be protected by a
liability rule.
The response is simple. During normal times, property rules have
some advantages over liability rules. Scholars have generated an
extensive literature on the relative merits of property rules versus
liability rules in different circumstances, across a wide variety of
substantive areas.372 When no crisis is raging, property rules may be
superior for many reasons. If it is difficult to detect violations of a
requirement, then protecting that requirement with a property rule
may deter violations.373 Similarly, liability rules that apply at all times
may invite opportunistic behavior.374 And calculating compensation
due under a liability rule can be difficult or expensive.375 In many
noncrisis situations, property rules have advantages over liability rules.
CONCLUSION
The IRS’s responses to the 2008–09 financial crisis demonstrate
that moving from property rules to liability rules temporarily can
minimize harm from a crisis, prevent windfalls, and even protect third
parties like workers and homeowners. This approach has benefits in
areas like constitutional law, patent law, and bankruptcy law.
Counterintuitively, moving to total nonenforcement, which would
seem even more lenient than moving to a liability rule, actually
provides less relief. The IRS’s responses also reveal many previously
unnoticed benefits of arranging shifts to liability rules before crises
start, ranging from faster responses to more flexible private contracts.
Policymakers should work now to prearrange shifts to liability rules to
handle the inevitable future financial crises and epidemics.

372. See, e.g., Blair-Stanek, supra note 9, at 1176 nn.25–27.
373. Id. at 1200–10.
374. Id. at 1213–14 (noting the problems if liability-rule amounts are too low); Kaplow &
Shavell, supra note 37, at 730–32 (discussing problems created by biased liability-rule amounts).
375. See Blair-Stanek, supra note 9, at 1214–16.

